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ABSTRACT
Evidence is presented that schooling for women is economically warranted
on several grounds:

private efficiency or relatively high individual private

market rates of return, relatively high social returns augmented by
externalities such as decreased child mortality and unwanted fertility, equity
in the sense of increased productive capabilities of a group that is relatively
poor, and intergeneration al redistribution toward the better health and
education of children and a slower growth in population.

Although investments

in the schooling of women have increased with economic development over time
within most nations, and with increasing per capita income across nations,
there remain major regions of Asia and Africa where the ratio of public
investment in the schooling of women relative to that of men is one-half to
two-thirds.

These large gender differentials in investments in human capital

that divide low income countries warrant careful quantitative study to focus
informed debate on the economic and demographic costs and benefits of
increasing investments in the schooling of women.

CHAPTER III - RErURNS TO WOMEN'S ~UCATION

T. Paul Schultz

Remarkably few detailed studies of returns to schooling for women
have sought to clarify social or private investment priorities.

As a

consequence, no one has looked for an explanation of why the high returns to
female education have not attracted more public and private investment in
women's schooling, particularly in those countries where women receive much
less education than men do.

Analysis is needed to understand the origins of

the gender differentials in returns to schooling.

They may be related partly

to the structure of aggregate demand for labor and partly to economic
constraints such as per capita income and the costs of delivering school
services (Schultz 1987).

The gender differences in investment behavior may be

perpetuated by the structure of regulations and incentives in public (and
private) education systems.

They may also reflect family decisionrnaking and

the preferences of parents who value greater productivity in a daughter less
highly than in_a son or who are unable to appreciate fully the enhanced
nonmarket productivity of better educated women.

Understanding why this

pattern occurs in some settings and how policy interventions can change family
behavior are challenges for researchers and program designers.

RATES OF RETURN TO SCHOOLING

Estimates of the rates of return to education are calculated in two
forms.

The private return is the internal rate of return that equalizes the

present discounted value of the private cost of attending school with the
present discounted value of the private after-tax gains the individual recoups
in subsequent productive activities.

The social return includes, in addition

to these private costs and gains, the cost of public and private school
subsidies and the gains in increased taxes more educated workers pay, as well
as any net positive social externalities that education generates that the
individual does not capture.
In practice, relatively few studies of private returns to education
even deduct from labor earnings or wage rates what the more educated worker is
likely to pay in increased taxes (income and indirect taxes), although doing
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so is not conceptually difficult.

This deduction would be irrelevant if the

number of hours worked were independent of education and taxes were
proportionate to wages, assumptions that may be plausible in analyzing the
returns to male education.

The first assumption conflicts with what is known

about the behavior of female labor supply, however.
The distinction between private and social returns to schooling in
most empirical studies merely involves including the additional social costs
of public expenditures per pupil in the school system in the calculation of
the internal social rate of return.

Thus, social returns to education are

predictably lower than private returns in proportion to the share of the total
costs of schooling that the public sector absorbs. This gap between private
and social returns to schooling is particularly large for higher education in
some relatively poor countries, where attendance at institutions of higher
education is rationed and students who gain admission do not necessarily pay
tuition and may even receive cost-of-living stipends (Psacharopoulos and
Woodhall 1985).
In primary and secondary schools, the opportunity value of the time
of those students who are removed from productive work in the family is the
primary private cost of schooling, augmented in some cases by private outlays
for books, school materials, uniforms, and transportation.

On the public cost

side, salaries of teachers are the dominant cost in poorer countries; indeed,
teachers' salaries in many such countries absorb 80 to 95 percent of public
expenditures on education (see UNESCO Yearbooks of Educational Statistics).
The private return to schooling provides the incentive for
individuals and families to invest in education, to the extent that they view
schooling as. an economic investment in the future productivity of the human
agent.

The consumption value of education provides another motivation for

private expenditures on schooling.

This motive is not_commonly observed,

however, and therefore is not analyzed as a differential force affecting the
level and mix of a society's educational investments.

Families and

individuals with equal access to credit and facing the same cost of capital
would efficiently invest in education as a form of human capital until the
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private return on additional schooling declined to the level of the private
cost of capital.

Thus, efficiency criteria alone would predispose a family to

invest differentially in the human capital of their children, depending on
their perception of the ability and opportunities of each child--assuming
ability and opportunity enhance the private returns to schooling (see, for
example, Becker 1981).
Social returns to education provide one set of guidelines by which a
society could efficiently allocate social investments and set priorities among
alternative educational programs, producing distinctive types of skills and
workers.

Individuals capture much of the social return to education, however,

so those groups that obtain high private returns for their children will be
strong supporters of the status quo.

Rent-seeking behavior in the upper and

middle classes is commonly a potent political force in low-income countries to
raise quality, maintain free access, and if necessary, even ration entry into
the better secondary and higher public educational institutions.

Though high

social returns signal the need to expand a particular segment of the school
system, if they are buttressed by high private returns, the public sector
should consider using fees (and scholarships) to finance such an expansion or
allowing a private educational system to satisfy the excess demand.

If social

returns are moderate primarily because of social externalities, and
consequently private returns are relatively low, the public sector should
expect to rely more on its own financing for school expansion.
An alternative criterion for allocating public subsidies to
education could emphasize those activities for which the social externalities
alone would justify public subsidies for education.

Externalities from

education are thought to be substantial at the basic primary level and to
diminish at the secondary, higher, and more technically specialized levels of
university training--levels at which individuals capture more of the social
benefits (minus taxes) ~rom their education (Weisbrod 1964).

Social

externalities are particularly well documented in studies of effects of
women's education, but they are rarely cited as a reason for expanding public
education for women.
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Research that is often produced in combination with university
education may itself generate external benefits that are an important source
of economic growth.

The products of university research are generally freely

available to firms and households, but partly because of their accessibility,
their productive value is difficult to assess.

This potential externality of

university training allied to research has not been quantitatively evaluated
in many low-income countries, to my knowledge.

A possible exception is in the

agricultural sciences, in which research and extension are sometimes
responsively connected (Evenson 1988).

Patterns in Overall Levels of Social and Private Returns

Psacharopoulos (1973 and 1985) has summarized several estimates of
rates of return to education by region and school level.
several general patterns in these returns.

Table 3.1 implies

For example, the more developed

the country, the lower the social return to education, both across countries
and within countries over time.

With notable exceptions, the higher the level

of schooling is within countries, the lower the return.

The social returns

appear to be about twice as large in Africa and Latin America as they are in
industrially advanced high-income countries.
between those extremes.

Social returns in Asia fall
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Table 3.1: Average Social and Private Rates of Returns
to Education by School Level

Region

Primary

27

Africa

14
(12)
12
(11)
16

(8)

(8)

13!!./

10
(15)

(15)

(9)

Latin America
High-Income
CountriesY

35

(6)

Note:
Y

Higher

19
(12)
14
(11)
19

(12)
18

Asia

Social
Secondary

Primary

Private
Secondary

Higher

45

28

(9)

(9)

(9)

34

15

18

33

(5)

(8)

(8)

61

28

26

(8)

(5)

(5)

(5)

8

192/

12

11

(7)

(14)

(15)

Numbers of countries reported in parentheses below mean.

Europe, United States, New Zealand, Israel.

W Not calculable in the majority of high-income countries, where the
comparison group without a primary education is small and highly
unrepresentative at younger ages.
Source:

Calculated by the author for most recent years when social returns
were available at all levels or all but primary level for high
income countries. Original studies summarized by Psacharopoulos
(1973) table 14, and (1985) table A-1.
In many low-income countries, the private returns to higher

education are twice the social returns, because the public costs of education
are a relatively large share of total costs.

The exception is Asia, where the

social returns to secondary and higher education for the same countries are
only moderately lower than the private returns.

In this region, the public

subsidies are only a moderate share of the total costs.

In contrast, Africa

and, to a lesser degree, Latin America have provided large public subsidies
for secondary and particularly for higher education.
Studies of the rate of return to schooling based on aggregate data
are often replicated by estimating earnings functions from individual survey
data.

In these logarithmic wage or earnings functions, the coefficient on

years of schooling approximates the private internal rate of return to
schooling (Mincer 1974; Rosen 1977).

The appendix to this chapter derives
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this relations hip under specific assumptio ns and illustrat es why the
proportio nate logarithm ic upward shift in the life-cycl e average wage rate
associate d with each year of schooling approxim ates the private return to
schooling .
The estimated coefficie nt on years of schooling in a logarithm ic
wage function tends to be slightly smaller than the estimated private return
to schooling derived from tabulated data on earnings and education costs by
age groups, as originall y performed by Becker (1964). Wage function
approxim ations of the private rate of return to education range from 13-25
percent in Latin America and Africa to 6-9 percent in high-inco me countries
(see, for example, Psacharop oulos 1985, table 3).
Within a country, the pattern of diminishi ng social marginal
efficienc y of human capital investmen ts supports the view that public
subsidies should focus first on the expansion of primary and then on secondary
These levels not only offer the highest returns, they are also the
most widely distribut ed and hence are more likely to be equitably distribut ed
across economic classes. Private returns tend to be highest in Africa, where
schooling .

large education al investmen ts began only recently. The high private returns
in Latin America may reflect the sluggish expansion of public schools at the
secondary level in recent decades. Portions of East and Southeas t Asia and
high-inco me countries have already achieved substanti al levels of human
capital investmen t. In fact, some studies suggest that the social returns to
schooling in these countries are roughly on a par with the private returns
from physical capital after taxes. Thus, in some regions, public investmen ts
in education could be increased efficient ly and equitably , whereas in
others--m ore rapidly growing countries -~the case for public investmen t in
school expan~ion depends in part on new evidence of social external ities (see,
for example, Lucas 1985; Romer 1983).
This growing body of data and analysis leads to the conclusio n that
in most developin g countries , the demand for more educated labor appears to be
increasin g at least as rapidly as the supply of more educated labor, although
in some cases macroecon omic swings in economic growth cause temporar ily high
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or low returns to schooling.

Relatively little analysis has addressed how

structural adjustment has affected-priva te returns to education in the short
run and over the longer term.
All the calculations of returns to education neglect the consumption
gains associated with schooling and any externalities, or "public good,"
attributes of education, because consensus is lacking on how to measure and
value these benefits.
SCHOOLING RETURNS, FAMILY LABOR SUPPLY, AND SAMPLE SELECTION

Many issues arise in the empirical measurement of returns to
schooling. The first class of problems involves the estimation bias introduced
by inadequate specification of student ability, parent background, and school
quality. Ideally, this bias could be corrected by agreement on specification
and by better data (Schultz 1988).

Most studies, however, must build on

imperfect specifications and data.

The direction of the bias these problems

may cause in estimating returns to education is unclear, as is their influence
on the level of returns for women relative to those for men.
The second class of problems arises because only a portion of the
population is asked to report the wage and related productivity information
needed to estimate a wage function.

A bias is likely if selection into this

sample of the population is not independent of the schooling-wage 
productivity relationship. The selection problem is likely to be even more
serious if the criterion for inclusion in the sample is choice of occupation
or migration; plausibly, both are linked to the education of workers. In
these cases, the problems of sample selection involve jointly explaining labor
market beha~ior and the determinants of wages. This may be important for
comparisons of returns to education of men and women, because men and women
work different amounts of time in wage employment and exhibit different labor
supply responses.
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Labor Supply and Unemployment

Individ uals with differe nt levels of educatio n may choose to work
differe nt numbers of hours. The rates of return to educatio n will then differ
dependi ng on whether they are based on compari sons of hourly wage rates or an
annual rate of earning s (Schultz 1968). Adjustin g for how people allocate
their time to market work in constru cting the benefit stream from female
educatio n can be importa nt in low-inco me countri es.
Accordi ng to Mincer' s (1974) equilibr ium investm ent framewo rk, the
present value of the film! of human and physica l capital is not affected by
investm ents in schoolin g. In this case, the total wealth effect of schoolin g
should be unimpor tant (see Lindsay 1971).
The volunta ry labor supply response to the increase d wage rate
offered to more educate d workers can be decompo sed into (1) an income effect
and (2) an income- compens ated price (wage) effect. Mincer' s framewo rk implies
that educatio n is associa ted with a relative ly small income effect. Mincer
assumes all individ uals can borrow at the same interes t rate, but this
assumpt ion may be less tenable in countrie s without well-dev eloped loan
markets . Where liquidi ty constra ints explain why low-inco me groups invest
less in their children , the more educated should tend to work fewer hours
because educatio n will be associa ted with a wealth advantag e and thus be
reflecte d in a demand for more leisure time. This tendency would lead to
underes timating the private return to schoolin g if the compari sons were framed
in terms of monthly or annual earning s (see the analysis of Thailan d
accompa nying table 3.7). The more educate d would receive part of their return
from schoolin g in the form of increase d nonmark et activiti es, includin g
leisure (se~, for example , Mohan 1986, for Colombi a). Convers ely, the more
educate d might tend to work longer hours in societie s in which family wealth
is more equally distribu ted and student loans and fellowsh ips help the poor
invest in human capital . The income- compens ated price (wage) effect
associa ted with a worker' s educatio n would encourag e the more educate d to work
longer hours.

If this were the only effect of educatio n on labor supply,
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comparisons of annual earnings would overstate the private returns to
schooling.
The partial association of education and hours of market work tends
to be positive for youth and married women when other sources of income, such
as family's or husband's, are held constant. When returns to schooling are
based on variations in annual earnings, the private returns may be overstated
because the offsetting loss of nonmarket production and leisure of the more
educated is not deducted from the gains in market earnings. The change in
wage rates (measured, for example, by annual earnings divided by hours)
attributabl e to education is thus a better approximati on of the private
welfare benefits from schooling than are changes in weekly, monthly, or annual
earnings, particularl y for women.

The preferred dependent variable in the

earnings function used to estimate private returns to schooling is the
logarithm of the hourly wage rate, deflated by local prices.W
Unemployme nt may be a productive period during which workers search
for job opportuniti es that match their skills. If unemployme nt is greater
among more educated youth during a relatively short period after they complete
their schooling, the opportunity cost of their job search should be included
along with the other costs of schooling that eventually will be recouped by
enhanced earnings in employment (Blaug 1973; Turnham 1971; Berry 1975; Gregory
1980; Berry and Sabot, 1984). Unemployme nt is generally lower among the more
educated than among the less educated a decade after they enter the labor
market. If this pattern does not reflect a current choice of the worker
between nonmarket activities and market work, then unemployme nt may be called
involuntary . Thus, one of the private gains from increased schooling is
enhanced access to regular work opportuniti es in the market labor force and
hence a lower incidence of involuntary unemployme nt.

To introduce measures of labor supply among the explanatory
W
variables in the wage function is clearly inappropria te unless they are
treated as endogenous variables that could also respond to education. Another
serious problem in estimating schooling returns is to explain the variation in
annual or monthly earnings by the variation in the number of hours or weeks
·
individuals work.
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Typical ly, analyst s only address pattern s of unemplo yment by level
of educatio n among men; no studies were found on the differe ntial effects of
unemplo yment on returns to schoolin g for women (see Tilak 1987, for some
evidenc e). Unemplo yment rates are frequen tly higher for women than for men,
as shown in table 3.2, although the reverse is true for a few countri es such
as Algeria , Syria, Iran, India, and South Korea. In other countri es, such as
the United States and Puerto Rico, the differen ce by sex in unemplo yment rate"s
has reversed over time. The issue here is how to incorpo rate differen ces in
unemplo yment among men and women in the labor force into the calcula tion of
the expecte d sex-spe cific returns to schoolin g.
Table 3.2: Unemplo yment Rates in Selecte d Countrie s by Gender
(percen t of labor force over 15)

Men

Women

25.9
11.5
10.3
2.9
18.4
8.9
11.2
14.0
3.2
12.9
2.1
3.4
9.3
7.4
10.8
6.2
4.6

6.6
11. 8
18.5
7.0
27.7
13.3
7.8
16.0
3.4
25.9
6.8
3.2
7.9
16.7
12.9
5.1
4.0

Site (Year)
Algeria , Alger (1966)
Ghana, Large Towns (1960)
Colombi a, Bogota (1968)
Argenti na, Buenos Aires (1965)
Guyana, Urban Areas (1965)
Panama, Urban Areas (1963/64 )
Puerto Rico (1969)
Trinida d, Tobago (1968)
Thailan d, Bangkok (1966)
Sri Lanka, Urban (1966)
Taiwan (1966)
India (1961/62 )
S. Korea, Non-farm (1966)
Malaya, Urban (1965)
Philipp ines, Urban (1965)
Syria (1967)
Iran, Tehran (1966)
Source:

Turnham (1971) table III.2, pp. 48-50

Because labor force particip ation and hours worked in the market
labor force are more respons ive to market wage opportu nities for some members
of the populat ion than for others, differen ces in unemplo yment rates may
paralle l differen ces in the labor supply elastic ity of demogra phic groups and
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reflect their range of employme nt opportun ities and different job search
behavior. The elasticit y of labor supply with respect to own market wage
rates tends to be greater for married women than for married men or for single
women, and greater for single men than for married men (Schultz 1981).
Table 3.3 shows unemploym ent for adult males and females by marital
status. Unemploym ent rates tend to be greater for married women than married
men, while unemploym ent is greater among single men than married men. The
unemploym ent rates are similar in magnitude for single men and women, except
in Malaysia and Philippin es, where the tabulatio ns reported by Turnham (1971)
have other special features. These patterns suggest that differenc es in
unemploym ent for men and women may be related to their labor market behavior.
Even if unemploym ent is viewed as purposefu l job-searc h activity, standard
estimates of labor earnings by schooling of men and women should in the future
be adjusted (downward ) to compensa te for the incidence of unemploym ent, or
time that is not reimburse d and also is not used in home productio n. If this
form of unemploym ent decreases with education , as Turnham (1971) and others
find, the private rate of return to schooling should increase when adjusted
for unemploym ent. Research has not confirmed how this adjustmen t will affect
the compariso n of private returns to the schooling of women and men.
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Table 3.3: Unempl oyment Rates in Urban Areas of Selecte d Countr ies
by Gender and Marita l Status
(perce nt of labor force)

Site, Popula tion (year)

Marrie d
Women
Men

Unmarr ied
Women
Men

Argent ina, Buenos Aires, ages 25-44 (1976)

1

6

na

na

Brazil , Sao Paulo, ages 25-44 (1980)

1

7

na

na

Bolivi a, La Paz, ages 25-44 (1980)

3

14

8

9

Colomb ia, Urban Areas, ages 25-44 (1973)

5

8

12

10

Paragu ay, Asunci on, age 25-44 (1979)

1

5

6

6

Peru, Urban Areas, ages 25-44 (1974)

2

3

8

6

Urugua y, Montev ideo, ages 25-44 (1978)

3

13

5

9

Malaya , urban areas,
experie nced labor force (1965)
Philipp ines, urban areas,
head of househ olds (1965)

22.0

10.0

24.0

15.0

3.7

11.7

7.4

2.9

na = Not availa ble from underl ying study.
Source :

Reyes (1982) table 5-11, p. 147; Turnham (1971) table III.5, p. 53.

Many studie s that estima te the returns to educat ion appear to
. One
exclud e the unempl oyed and to neglec t the variati on in labor supply
This
reason for omittin g the unempl oyed is the lack of an approp riate wage.
studies
omissio n is anothe r form of sample -select ion bias that arises in most
additio n,
that are restric ted to people reporti ng wages or labor earnin gs. In
ome
unempl oyment is probab ly more diffic ult to measur e reliab ly in low-inc
ity in
countr ies than in high-in come countr ies becaus e of the greate r ambigu
s to
classif ying activi ties as nonmar ket or market . Noneth eless, return
s of bias
school ing should be estima ted for everyon e to avoid potent ial source
te how
in sample selecti on. Simulta neous analys is should therefo re evalua
wage
educat ion affect s market labor supply behavi or, unempl oyment , and the
rate of those employ ed.
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Occupational Choice

Returns to education are often calculated for subpopulati ons. If
these subpopulati ons are defined by characteris tics over which the individual
has no control, such as race, caste, or gender, the interpretat ion is
straightforw ard, though differentia l participati on in the wage labor force
remains a potential source of bias in intergroup comparisons . When the
subpopulati ons are not closed, however, as in the case of regions because of
interregion al migration, or in the case of occupations because education may
qualify some for entry into an occupation, a complex problem of selection bias
may be present.~
Possibly the most important occupationa l distinction is between wage
and salary earners and self-employ ed workers. Most research on returns to
schooling focuses on employees because their labor earnings can be observed
more directly; self-employ ed respondents must be asked to deduct purchased and
imputed values of inputs from gross income. When employees are a large
fraction of the labor force, as in high-income countries, omitting the self
employed has become a standard, if indefensibl e, practice in empirical studies
of educational returns. When wage earners are a small fraction of the labor
force, however, the synthetic age-wage profile across education groups of
employees may be a misleading basis for estimating the lifetime returns to
schooling in the overall economy. Yet, relatively few studies analyze how
selection into the employee sample could bias the estimated returns to
education (see, for example, Anderson 1982, Griffin 1987).

It is still tempting to decompose the effects of such exogenous
traits as education, race, or gender on earnings and to appraise what portion
of the effect occurs because of occupationa l sorting and what portion occurs
within occupations (Polachek 1979). Because the stochastic processes
determining occupation and earnings are undoubtedly affected jointly by
unobserved factors, this form of decompositi on of a simultaneou s equation
system is feasible only when identifying restriction s are known~ priori; that
is, a factor known to influence occupationa l choice or placement, but not
earnings, can be used to explain occupationa l sorting but justifiably can be
omitted from the structural wage equation. Studies nonetheless assume,
without justificati on, that occupationa l choice and earnings are
stochastica lly independen t and can therefore be modeled as block-recu rsive.

~
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The probab le covaria nce betwee n an indivi dual's choice of whethe r to
ial
be a wage earner or a self-em ployed worker and that person 's potent
tions are
produc tivity can be ignore d to simpli fy the problem . Separa te estima
functio n
then reporte d withou t correc ting for sample selecti on in each wage
worker 's
for the self-em ployed and the wage earner s. The coeffi cients on a
tionate
years of school ing are then compar ed within the two strata . The propor
to be
upward shifts in wage rates or earning s associ ated with school ing tend
and
of a simila r magnit ude in Thailan d (Chisw ick 1979), Colomb ia (Fields
ory
Schult z 1982), and Israel (Ben-P orath 1986). The increas e in transit
ized in
income variati ons in the earning s of the self-em ployed is often emphas
from
the econom ics literat ure, but its relevan ce to the returns realize d
educat ion has not been explor ed.
These compar isons of self-em ployed and wage earner s have two
and able to
weakne sses. First, they assume that the self-em ployed are willing
inputs
report their labor earnin gs net of the value of purcha sed and owned
in
such as rental value of owned land and busine ss capita l. In fact,
d
develo ped countr ies, such as the United States , farmers and uninco rporate
much
entrep reneur s report income s to survey s and tax author ities that are
lower than the income the nation al accoun ts impute to them. How this
educat ion
unders tateme nt of self-em ployed income would bias compar isons among
Teilhe t
groups is unclea r. To reduce this potent ial source of reporti ng bias,
inform al
and Waldor f (1983) follow ed a small sample of self-em ployed in the
to
sector of Bangko k to derive their own estima tes of the net hourly return
to be no
the labor of the self-em ployed . The returns to school ing appear ed
ion
less for them than for wage earner s, althoug h obtain ing more educat
ment.
predisp osed men in the Bangko k sample to obtain a job for wage employ
The second weakne ss is that the fractio n of the labor force that is
The
self-em ployed often increa ses with age groups in a cross- section .
physic al
life-cy cle proces s of accumu lating skills, experie nce, contac ts, and
become
capita l appear s to increa se the likelih ood that an individ ual will
ching
self-em ployed (Fields and Schult z 1982, Ben-Po rath 1986). In approa
work
retirem ent, self-em ployme nt may also afford a worker more flexib le
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opportu nities than does wage employm ent (Fuchs 1980). A secular tendenc y
exists, however , for the share of self-emp loyed workers in the labor force to
decline with economi c developm ent (Kuznets 1966). Little empiric al evidenc e
is availab le to help disentan gle the effects of life-cyc le changes from those
attribu table to secular changes during developm ent.
Nonmarke t Returns to Schooling and Sample-Selection Bias

Nonmark et returns to educatio n cannot be valued in compara ble
monetar y terms and readily aggrega ted. Therefo re, evidenc e of the returns to
women's schoolin g tends to rely on analyse s of differen ces in product ivity
among wage earners who have differe nt amounts of educatio n. The central
problem in constru cting the statisti cal compari sons from which to estimat e the
returns to schoolin g of women is to correct for any potenti al bias that might
be introduc ed into the analysi s because the women who work for wages may be
more (or less) product ive than the average person.
Statist ical procedu res designe d for dealing with such a problem of
sample- selectio n bias have been develop ed in economi cs in the last decade
(Heckman 1979 and 1987). They require informa tion on a variabl e for the
entire populat ion that is statisti cally correla ted with the probab ility of
being in the wage earner sample, but the variabl e must not be related to
variatio n in market product ivity (wages) that is left unexpla ined after
control ling for educatio n, post-sch ooling experien ce, and so on.
This sample- selectio n methodo logy permits estimat ion of the effect
of educatio n on market product ivity for the average person so that an unbiase d
estimat e can be obtaine d of the private and social returns to schoolin g. If a
particu lar p~rson does not work in a wage job, it is because that individ ual
can work in a more product ive job at home or as a self-emp loyed worker, or
because the extra costs of finding and holding a wage job exceed the financi al
gain. To correct an analysi s of wage function s for this potenti al sample
selectio n bias require s a variabl e that influenc es only a person' s net
nonmark et reserva tion wage but not her or his market wage offer. Such a
variabl e could be the family's nonearn ed income, land, or other assets that
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raise the persons's productiv ity in self-empl oyment and also increase the
individu al's demand for leisure, assuming leisure is a "normal" economic good.
Sample-s election correctio ns should be performed routinely in the
estimatio n of wage functions that are designed to estimate the average private
returns to schooling for women and for men. Although this practice is
spreading , the methodolo gy generally has not been identifie d by a common set
of economic ally justified variables . The correctio n procedure may be
particula rly importan t in low-incom e countries , which tend to have a higher
proportio n of family workers and self-empl oyed workers, and for women, because
the proportio n who earn wages can be relativel y small.
Correctin g for this sample-s election bias by satisfact ory
identific ation restricti ons sometimes substant ially change the estimated
private rates of returns to schooling . At this time, however, we do not know
why these differenc es occur in certain countries and not others, or why they
vary by level of schooling . If these studies are indicativ e of what future
research will find, the proper statistic al adjustmen t of wage functions for
sample-s election bias may not uniformly change the relative ranking of
education al returns to women and men. Improving the empirical research
methods, however, should raise our confidenc e in the basic facts and improve
our forecasts of education al investmen t prioritie s, by level and gender, over
the course of economic developme nt in a particula r country. These improved
empirical estimates of the returns to schooling should also help explain
long-run, simultane ous shifts in the aggregate supply of and demand for
educated labor that occur during the process of modern economic growth.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF MARKET RETURNS TO EDUCATION

Many limitatio ns to the use of intergrou p compariso ns for estimatin g
returns to schooling are beyond the scope of this paper; they are discussed
elsewhere (see, for example, Griliches 1977, Schultz 1988). One such
limitatio n is the inadequac y of the statistic al controls to account for
individua l ability (that is, the bias of omitted inputs or selection by
comparati ve advantage ) (Willis and Rosen 1979; Heckman and Sedlachec k 1985).
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n; becaus e
Anothe r is the neglec t of quality of educat ion in the wage functio
individ uals
quality tends to be direct ly related to the quanti ty of school ing
ing may be
receiv e, the return s to additio nal years of consta nt-qua lity school
overes timated (Welch 1966; Behrma n and Birdsa ll 1983).
No consen sus exists on precis ely which variab les should enter the
invest in
wage functio n or how to identi fy statist ically those individ uals who
ies for
school ing or work for wages in the labor force. Differ ent strateg
to
constr ucting the compar ison groups may yield private rates of return
the simple st
school ing that are substa ntially lower, or sometim es higher , than
linear or
logarit hmic wage functio n that include s (1) years of school ing in
nce (Mince r
spline form and (2} a quadra tic in years of post-sc hoolin g experie
school ing
1974). The contro versies over the method s of estima ting return s to
of return
do not appear to be german e to the purpos e of compar ing the rates
ion,
and determ ining investm ent priori ties betwee n male and female educat
s to
becaus e most of these problem s that might bias estima tes of return
ion of
educat ion operate simila rly for women and men, with the possib le except
of such
labor supply . Nevert heless, assessi ng precis ely the absolu te level
of women
return s to private and public resourc es investe d in the educat ion
remain s an import ant, if subsid iary, object ive.W
Labor Supply and Rates of Return to Schooling: Estimation Methodology

Many studie s have reporte d private rates of return to school ing of
able,
men and women (summa rized in table 3.4). The studie s are not compar
s. Severa l
howeve r, becaus e they use differe nt concep tual and empiri cal method
related aspect s of the estima tion method ology need to be revised and
cy of
standa rdized to improv e our confide nce in the compa rability and accura
such estima tes for determ ining investm ent priori ties.
For exampl e, if more able studen ts self-se lect themse lves into the
W
overst ated
more educat ed ·compa rison group, the returns to educat ion could be
ing is
school
unless a selecti on-cor rected measur e of the privat e return s to
not
comput ed (Willis and Rosen 1979). But this form of selecti on might
men
necess arily bias the compar ison of the direct ly measur ed returns of
ce who
influen
to
way
us
analogo
an
in
s
operate
relativ e to women, if ability
girls.
goes to school among both boys and
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Table 3.4: Returns to Education by School Level and Gender

Country {Year)

Estimation
Method

Colombia, Bogota (1965)
Kenya (ca 1960)
Malaysia (ca 1960)
Brazil (1960)
South Korea (1971)
Taiwan (1982)
Puerto Rico (1959)
Andra Pradesh,
India (1977)
Ivory Coast {1985)

II

I

y
y
y
y
y

II

I
II

Primary
Male Female
18.2
21. 7
9.4
17.9
nr
8.4
29.5
8.9
7.2
18.3

nil
7.1
9.3
38.6
nr
16.0
18.4
11.8
0.3
5.5

Secondary
Male Female
34.4
23.6
12.3
nr
13.7
nr
27.3
8.7
6.8
17.0

18.9
19.5
11.4
nr
16.9
nr
40.8
11. 9
2.41
28.7

Higher
Male Female
4.5
nr
10.7
nr
15.7
nr
21. 9
6.2
5.5
21.1

5.3
nr
9.8
nr
22.9
nr
9.0
8.9
5.5
13.6

nr = Not reported.
Note:

Y

- includes participati on rate in labor force to deflate returns,
depressing female returns disproporti onately.
II - estimates wage rate relationshi p without labor force adjustment.

I

Estimation method not known.

Source:

Colombia, Bogota--Sc hultz 1968, table 7, hourly wage; Andra Pradesh,
India--Tila k 1987, table 6.8), average return for school level; Ivory
Coast--van der Gaag and Vijverberg 1987, appendix 2; other
countries--P sacharopou los 1973, table 4.5, and 1985.

First, how should the potential productivit y gains attributabl e to
schooling be adjusted when people work different amounts of time in the labor
force? Second, how should the effect of education on nonmarket productivit y
be estimated and combined with market productivit y effects to yield average
returns to schooling for the entire population? Third, what techniques can
correct for the potential bias that enters these studies when direct
observation s on productivit y are inevitably limited to only a portion of the
population- -say, to those who report labor income and hours worked?
In the first studies of the association between education and labor
earnings, private rates of return were calculated under the assumption that
better educated people benefit from schooling only to the extent that they

19
hold a job in the labor force (and report earnings ).~ Thus, if a year of
additiona l schooling raised the wage rates of men and women by x percent per
year and they both worked full-time in the labor force, the life-cycl e
internal rate of return to the opportun ity cost of attending school for that
year was x percent for men and women. If, however, women worked only
half-time in the labor force after completin g their schooling , while men
worked full time, the conclusio n was that women earned only half the rate of
return of men on their year of schooling .
Becker (1964), in his seminal contribut ion on this subject, observed
that the lower return to women's education attributa ble to their lower
participa tion in the labor force was consisten t with the smaller proportio n of
women than men attending college in the United States in the 1950s (p. 178).
Later empirical studies and surveys that specifica lly addressed gender
differenc es in rates of return to education used Becker's methodolo gy (Hines,
Tweeten, and Redfern 1970; Thais and Carnoy 1969; Psacharop oulos 1973;
Woodhall 1973). The implicit assumptio n underlyin g this research was that

From the perspecti ve of the early 1960s, this empirica l strategy may
~
have reflected a desire to avoid overstati ng the returns to schooling , because
the concept was novel and controve rsial. The resulting differenc es in
empirica l methods has led to reports of women's school returns being deflated
for nonpartic ipation, in some cases by half or more. In other reports, the
estimates are drawn directly from wage functions without deflation or sample
selection correctio n.
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peop le work ing outsi de of the
scho oling had no effec t on the prod uctiv ity of
mark et labo r force .W
have chall enge d this
A large numb er of subse quen t empi rical studi es
ases the prod uctiv ity of time
assum ption . They indic ated that educ ation incre
of women (Mich ael 1982 ;
in nonm arket prod uctio n, parti cula rly in the case
ty cost of the time of
Haveman and Wolf e 1984 ). More over, the oppo rtuni
; girls were impl icitly
fema les in scho ol was not symm etrica lly disco unted
labo r force to atten d scho ol, a
assum ed to be givin g up a full- time job in the
ing assum ption s for
patte rn that migh t not have been true. These work
bias on the rates of retur n to
estim ating the rates of retur n exer t a downward

d if educ ation
The analy sis of educ ation al retur ns is comp licate
W
in a work er's
ase
incre
An
).
influ ence s the supp ly of labor (Sch ultz 1968
mark et labo r
ing
reduc
t
human capi tal is expe cted to exer t an incom e effec
ly. If
supp
labor
et
supp ly and a subs titut ion effec t incre asing mark
human capi tal
the
iring
acqu
indiv idua l or the fami ly bears all the costs of
ngs, then
earni
in
gain
unted
and those costs exac tly offse t the mark et disco
is the
This
tal is zero.
the incom e effec t of the incre ase in human capi
Beck er
by
oped
t mode l devel
impl icit assum ption in the equil ibriu m inves tmen
ay (1971 ).
(1964 ) and Minc er (1974 ) and elabo rated by Linds
, the more educ ated
If no incom e effec t is asso ciate d with educ ation
titut ion effec t on labo r
shou ld work more hour s, becau se the rema ining subs
s can be read ily found , such
supp ly must be posi tive. But empi rical exce ption
ated work ed less than those
as in Bogo ta, Colom bia, where the univ ersit y educ
Thai land, where in 1981 men
with only secon dary scho oling (Sch ultz 1968) and
(Sch ultz 1989 ). Thus , in
with more univ ersit y train ing work ed fewe r hours
be asso ciate d with the
may
reali ty, both incom e and subs titut ion effec ts
shou ld inclu de the
oling
acqu isitio n of scho oling , and the retur n to scho
ed by the subs titut ion
induc
t
incom e effec t but exclu de the labor supp ly effec
earni ngs func tion is
the
of
effec t. In prac tice, if the depen dent varia ble
on years of scho oling
nt
ficie
the logar ithm of the hour ly wage rate, the coef
labo r supp ly cons tant. This
appro xima tes the priva te rate of retur n, hold ing
igibl e, as assum ed in the
proce dure is corre ct if the incom e effec t is negl
ion effec t on labor supp ly
equil ibriu m inves tmen t mode l, and the subs titut
leisu re. If the more educ ated
shou ld be disre gard ed as a comp ensat ing loss in
nmen t is asso ciate d with a
work fewer hour s, whic h impl ies educ ation al attai
ate the priva te rate of
gain in weal th, then this proce dure will unde restim
retur n to scho oling .
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groups, such as women, that particip ate in the labor force less than the
average person does or that work more often as an unpaid family worker. W
Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974) also analyze d the differen ces across
individ uals in annual earning s, combini ng the effect of schoolin g on the
worker' s potenti al product ivity per hour with its potenti al effect on market
labor supply and unemplo yment. The empiric al consequ ence of this decision is
not theoret ically obvious , but any empiric al tendency for unemplo yment rates
to be lower and labor supply to be larger among the better educate d would bias
estimat es of the rate of return to schoolin g upward, when the logarith m of
annual or monthly earning s is used as the depende nt variabl e rather than the
(prefera ble) logarith m of the hourly wage rate.
The usual assumpt ion in labor economi cs is that people enter the
market labor force when the market wage they are offered (after taxes and
fixed costs of entering the labor force) exceeds the reserva tion wage that is
determi ned by their margina l product ivity in nonmark et or home activit ies.
When an individ ual shifts time from nonmark et to market work, the nationa l
income may increase , but the broader welfare indicato r of "full income"
(Becker 1965), or the potenti al product ivity of the human agent, remains
As people vary the hours they work in the market labor force, the
observa ble market wage rate continu es to approxim ate their nonmark et
product ivity. Only .when they leave the labor force entirely can we infer

unchang ed.

their nonmark et product ivity exceeds their market wage offer. The problem is
how to estimat e the product ivity of nonmark et time for nonpart icipants in the
labor force, by educatio n, so as to incorpo rate this informa tion into the

Be~ker (1964) used the average earning s (of those with earning s)
from tabulati ons of the 1950 Census and apparen tly then deflate d these benefit
of
streams by particip ation rates. This approac h ignored the sample selectio n
ivity
product
mixing
those who had positiv e earning s, as well as the problem of
per hour and labor supply respons es associa ted with educatio n. Mincer (1974)
examine d the 1960 Census public-u se sample and fit the individ ual's logarith m
of annual earning s to educatio n and other variabl es. His analysi s included
only individ uals with positiv e earning s, but no correct ion for the potenti al
bias due to this sample- selectio n was made. Mincer' s and Becker' s analyse s
focus primari ly on males and not females , and some of these issues are less
serious for the analysi s of males.
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calcul ation of the return s to educat ion. Estima ting the nonmar ket
atical
produc tivity of nonpar ticipan ts require s that we specify the mathem
functio n for nonmar ket produc tivity functio n (for exampl e, linear or
consen sus
nonlin ear) and show how its parame ters are identif ied. There is no
on how this should be done, and it is not attemp ted here.
The origin al method ology of Becker and Mincer for estima ting the
educat ion
return s to school ing can be improv ed, for exampl e, by assumin g that
same
affect s hourly labor produc tivity in market and nonmar ket work hy the
on years
amount , or that it is neutra l betwee n these sector s. The coeffi cient
te of the
of school ing in a logarit hmic hourly wage functio n is then an estima
the
privat e of rate of return to school ing. Resear ch must now apprai se
ology
severi ty of the bias remain ing in this revise d simple estima tion method
not
becaus e of the undere stimati on of the nonmar ket produc tivity of those
partic ipatin g in the labor force.
Fixing the effect of school ing on nonmar ket produc tivity to zero
a large
appear s, with hindsi ght, to have been unjust ified and to have led to
The
downward bias in the estima ted rates of return to educat ion for women.
bias in the estima ted rates of return attribu table to analyz ing annual
ibed,
earnin gs, rather than the hourly wage rate, cannot be genera lly prescr
and wage
for it depend s on the joint determ ination of labor supply behavi or
ing to
functio ns in a specif ic society . Simila rly, researc h is only beginn
evalua te the bias on estima tes of the return to school ing of women
attribu table to the selecte d sample of wage earner s. This bias could
entire
overst ate or unders tate the true rate of return to educat ion for the
popula tion (Heckman 1979 and 1987).
Th~ore tically , the variab le needed to identif y the nonmar ket
tive
produc tivity (or reserv ation wage) functio n is a househ old fixed produc
does not
factor that affects the indivi dual's nonmar ket produc tivity but that
short
alter his or her labor produc tivity to a firm in the market . In the
a woman' s
run, childre n have been viewed as such a variab le in that they raise
howeve r,
produc tivity only in the home (Gronau 1974). Over the life cycle,
wage
this variab le is also jointly determ ined and respon sive to labor market
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Thus, it should be viewed as endoge nous or as determ ined within the
assets , and
same framew ork (Schul tz 1981). Land owners hip and family busine ss
measur es
the market produc tivity of a person 's spouse may be more satisfa ctory
time
of fixed househ old endowm ents that enhanc e the value of an indivi dual's

rates.

in nonmar ket activi ties. The choice of this identif ying restric tion
reted and
determ ines how the estima tes of the market wage functio n are interp
hence whethe r the implie d rate of return to school ing is a satisfa ctory
of wage
estima te for the entire popula tion or only for the nonrand om sample
earner s.
If more than one selecti on proces s is used to define the sample for
multip le
estima tion, and the selecti on proces ses have differe nt determ inants,
e,
sample -select ion equatio ns and correc tions are used (see for exampl
labor
Catsia pis and Robins on 1982). For exampl e, partic ipatio n in the market
nt home and
force and accepta nce of wage employ ment may be respon ses to differe
less
market constr aints. If the margin al produc t of labor is measur ed with
scheme
error for wage and salary worker s than for self-em ployed worker s, this
error,
of double sample selecti on may be approp riate, to reduce measur ement
despite the loss in the final sample size.
Many studie s of the returns to educat ion tend to include only wage
s for whom
earner s and thus exclud e the self-em ployed and unpaid family worker
relativ ely
a wage is diffic ult to infer or measur e precis ely. This group is a
a major
small segmen t of the labor force in high-in come countr ies, but it is
part in low-inc ome countr ies; for exampl e, nonmar ket worker s, the
of the
self-em ployed and family unpaid worker s togeth er repres ent about half
(Schul tz
adult male popula tion and two-th irds of the adult female popula tion
analyz ing
1989). Thus, any bias from sample selecti on could be import ant in
countr ies
the educat ional return s for men, as well as for women, in low-inc ome
(Nakam ura and Nakamu ra 1988).
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Empiric al Studies: Selective Review of Evidence

of
Table 3.5 summa rizes the privat e rates of return to years
ries. All of the
schoo ling for men and women in severa l Latin Ameri can count
dology (Schu ltz
relate d studie s used a common conce ptual and statis tical metho
supply issue by
1980a ). Althou gh these estim ates deal plausi bly with the labor
e female return s by
analyz ing the hourly wage which does not errone ously deflat
wage sample 
labor force partic ipatio n. They do not, howev er, correc t for
estim ates are
select ion bias. Becau se the sample s are small, some of the
eviden ce that
impre cise. Overa ll, howev er, these studie s provid e no clear
s do differ
return s to schoo ling differ system atical ly by gende r. Return
of differ ences in
consid erably across count ries, howev er, presum ably becaus e
in schoo ling
macroe conom ic condi tions and the level of past invest ments
(Schu ltz 1988) .
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Table 3.5: Estimates of Private Returns, to Education ,
in Selected Labor Markets and Years
(percent per annum)

Year of
Survey

Site
Argentine , Buenos Aires
(estimate s similar in 1976)
Bolivia, La Paz
(estimate s similar in 1976)
Brazil, Sao Paulo
(estimate s higher in 1980)
Colombia
(estimate s lower in 1980)
Paraguay, Asuncion
(estimate s similar in 1977)
Peru
Note:

!I

Internal Rate of Return
Ages 45-65
Ages 25-44
Women
Men
Women
Men

1980!1'

9.3

6.6

10.0

11.0

1980

9.8

11.0

9.6

6.7

1971

5.4

6.3

6.0

6.1

1973
1979

18.0
11.0

18.0
8.0

16.0
10.0

14.0
11.0

1974

14.0

14.0

11.0

19.0

Private returns refer to the estimated coefficie nt (times 100) on the
variable years of completed education in a logarithm ic hourly wage rate
regressio n which also includes post-scho oling experienc e, experienc e
squared, and some regional or migration origin variables . Samples vary
in size from 21 to 3,478, but all estimates are statistic ally
significa ntly different from zero at the .001 confidenc e level (t >
2.83). The selection only of workers in the labor force for whom wage
rate could be calculate d is not treated as a specific source of bias in
these estimates .

The available age groups in Argentina are 25-49 and over 49.

Source:

Schultz (1988).

An analysis of the returns to education in Andra Pradesh, India
illustrat es how sensitive the calculati ons of returns are to the treatment of
the rate of labor force participa tion by women (Tilak 1989). Both the private
and the social returns to schooling at virtually every level are greater for
women than for men when the returns are adjusted only for unemploym ent. When
nonparti cipation in the labor force is also factored into the calculati on, as
Becker proposed, the private rate of return for women is less than it is for
men (see results for Andra Pradesh in table 3.4). This study also documents
the lower public cost of female versus male education and the lower
opportun ity cost of time for female than for male students. The adjustmen t
for nonpartic ipation of women apparentl y is not introduce d to deflate the
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of
opport unity cost of female studen t time but only to deflate the stream
benefi ts from work in the labor force.
A study of Sri Lanka also confirm ed that women' s return to
s that
school ing, when not deflate d by labor force partic ipatio n rates, exceed
cate of
of men. The privat e rate of return to comple ting the genera l certifi
than for
exams at the end of second ary school is three times higher for women
areas (14
men in urban areas (36 versus 13 percen t) and twice as high in rural
for
versus 7 percen t). At the univer sity level, howeve r, the rates of return
table
men and women in Sri Lanka appear to conver ge (Sahn and Alderm an 1988,

17).
Fixed- effect estima tion proced ures provid e anothe r approa ch to
or
elimin ating the bias that may arise from certain types of unobse rved
a number
omitted variab les in a relatio nship. A cross- section is drawn from
and
of distin ct locali ties in which the price and quality of market goods
ce the
public servic es may differ . If these local market variab les influen
lled for
produc tivity of school ing or its quality , then they should be contro
In this
in estima ting the return s by varying only the years of school ing.
wage
case, introdu cing a fixed effect for every school distric t into the
,
functio n remove s any bias attribu table to the omissio n of school quality
The effect
which might be correl ated with the quanti ty of school ing receive d.
be
of other local market variab les, such as size of school s, cannot then
that
estima ted, becaus e they do not vary within the commun ity. To the extent
the quality of local school s change s at differe nt rates over time across
s or
region s and that individ uals in a school distri ct move across region
in which
attend more than one school and work in region s differe nt from those
te
they attende d school , the commun ity fixed effect become s a less adequa
contro l for school quality .
Family backgro und probab ly has its own impact on averag e ability ,
and
through geneti c and environ mental mechan isms that instil l motiva tions
e. If
habits and also influen ce the quality of school ing that sibling s receiv
correl ated
these family backgr ound charac teristi cs affect produc tivity and are
in all
with years of school ing, their omissio n from the wage functio n would
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likeliho od also bias upward the estimate d rate of return to schoolin g. One
strategy for dealing with these unobser ved charact eristics is to introduc e
fixed effects for each family. The estimate s of schoolin g returns are then
based only on within- family variatio ns in worker product ivity. This
procedu re, however , may increase the relative importan ce of measure ment error
by elimina ting all between -family variatio n. Exagger ated measure ment errors
would bias to zero the within househo ld fixed-e ffect estimat es of schoolin g
returns (Grilich es 1977 and 1979). Househo ld fixed effects are, therefo re,
likely to represe nt a lower bound on the estimat es of the effects of schoolin g
on market product ivity. Moreove r, the restrict ion of the estimat ion sample to
those residing in a family that has another wage earner may itself serious ly
distort the compari son group and thus bias the return estimat es in other
directio ns.
Private rates of return to schoolin g have been estimate d for men and
women from a 1986 survey of Indones ia. This study compare s standard estimat es
of the wage function to those that include both communi ty fixed-e ffects (proxy
for school quality and the like) and househo ld fixed-e ffects (proxy for family
backgro und correla tes) (Behrma n and Deolali kar 1988). Table 3.6 shows returns
for three increme nts of schoolin g--prim ary, general senior high school, and
Private rates of returns to schoolin g for women in all
compari sons exceed those for men, and (as expected ) the estimat es that include
commun ity and househo ld fixed-e ffects are between 9 and 24 percent smaller
than those obtaine d from the standard regressi ons that include interfam ily and

univers ity.W

These estimate s do not attempt to control for the
potenti ally unrepre sentativ e charact er of the sample of wage earners , nor are
the two sets of estimat es based on the same sample, because 16 percent of the
intercom munity variatio n.

A ·logarith mic monthly earning s function is estimate d pooling men and
W
women; this function include s dummy variabl es for nine levels of schoolin g and
a quadrat ic in age. Paramet ers are estimate d for the differen ce between male
and female coeffic ients for all variabl es, includin g the interce pt. The
commun ity and househo ld fixed effects are believe d to control for possibl e
school quality variatio n and the effect of family backgro und on earning s.
Unfortu nately, the ordinar y regressi on estimat es and those includin g the fixed
effects are for differe nt samples , raising the possibi lity that the
differen ces reporte d may be due to the differe nt samples and not due to the
introdu ction of the fixed-e ffect control s.
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wage earners included in the first set of estimates apparently did not reside
in a household with another wage earner and are therefore excluded from the
fixed-effec t estimates (Behrman and Deolalikar 1988, table 3). Differences in
the private rates of return estimated for women and men in Indonesia change
moderately as fixed effects are added for the community and household, with
the difference decreasing returns at the primary school level and increasing
returns at the university level.
Table 3.6: Implied Private Return to an Additional Year
of Schooling in Indonesia by Gender
(percent per annum)

Sex, Controls
Females:
Without fixed-effec t
controls
With community and
family fixed-effec ts controls
Males:
Without fixed-effec t
controls
With community and
family fixed-effec ts controls
Note:

Primary

General
Senior High

University

9.1
(21.1)

11.8
(43.4)

12.4
(27.8)

6.9
(17.3)

9.6
(35.3)

10.9
(24.7)

7.6
(2.64)

8.2
(10.9)

9.2
(6.41)

6.1
{1.43)

6.2
(10. 8)

8.4
(5.23)

The absolute value oft ratios are reported in parentheses beneath the
coefficient s in the case of female returns, and for the difference
between the male and female regression coefficient s beneath the male
returns. Thus, a significant t ratio under a male return suggests that
the rate of return on schooling for men and women differ by a
statistical ly significan t amount in this pooled earnings regression.

Source:

Be~rman and Deolalikar (1988), table 2.

Chiswick (1976) developed a technique for including self-employ ed
workers in the estimation of an annual earnings function along with wage
earners, thereby avoiding sample-sele ction bias due to analyzing only wage
Her approach attributed a share of self-employ ed earnings to
entreprene urial capital or risk-taking . Based on an analysis of Bangkok from

earners.
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the 1971 Socioeco nomic Survey of Thailan d, male wage earners (not
self-em ployed at all) receive d a 10.4 percent return on their years of
schoolin g, whereas females received a 14.5 percent return. Includin g part
and full-tim e self-emp loyed in the sample reduced the returns to schoolin g
only slightly , to 9.1 percent for men and 13.0 percent for women. The
inclusio n of the self-emp loyed increase d the urban estimat ion sample by 39
percent for males and by 53 percent for females . In both cases, women's
returns exceede d those for men, but those who are self-emp loyed reporte d
slightly lower returns on their schoolin g than did wage earners . This is
broadly consist ent with the pattern of more women with educatio n beyond
primary school working in wage jobs than the less educated . Whether
underre porting of incomes by self-emp loyed biases such estimate d returns to
schoolin g--and if so, by how much--i s uncerta in.
Few studies of the relation ships between wage rates and schoolin g
have assesse d how taking the selectiv e sample of wage earners biases findings
(see, for example , Anderso n 1982; Mohan 1986; Griffin 1987; King and others
Moreove r, these studies often deal with men alone or
women alone and thus do not help assess whether the bias due to sample
selectio n modifie s systema tically compari sons of male-fem ale estimat ed returns
to educatio n, as reported in tables 3.4 and 3.5. This is an importa nt issue
1986; Schultz 1988).

for public policy but one that has receive d surprisi ngly little empiric al
study.
Griffin (1987) analyze s the earning s of married women in the
Philipp ines in 1980 to apprais e estimat es of schoolin g returns subject to
alterna tive methods for dealing with sample- selectio n bias. He estimat es a
nonmark et (reserva tion) wage function and a function for market wage offers.
The reserva tion wage function determin es the shadow value of nonmark et time of
the individ ual, and hence what the individ ual requires to induce him or her to
enter the market labor force. Heckman 's selectio n-corre cted model is
identif ied within the context of the family or bargain ing labor supply model.
A standar d log-line ar specific ation of the earning s function is estimat ed in
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The
which returns to school ing are consta nt across school ing levels .W
is 18
selecti on-cor rected maximum likelih ood estima te of school ing returns
on only
percen t, compar ed with the conven tional estima te of 14 per~en t (based
g a sample 
the one-th ird of the sample who earn wages) . In this case, adoptin
school ing
selecti on correc tion proced ure increas es, the estima ted return s to
nt
for women and the select ivity term is statis tically signifi cantly differe
from zero, showin g that the sample of wage-e arning women is not a random
sample of the popula tion with regard to their wage rates.
King (1989) analyz ed the earning s of women in the 1985-86 Peruvi an
in paid
Living Standa rd Survey . A probit equatio n for women partici pating
estima te
employ ment (that is, both wage earners and self-em ployed ) is used to
The
an hourly earning s functio n with Heckma n's (1979) two-sta ge proced ure.
from 12.2
sample -select ion correc tion decrea sed the rate of return for women
ary
to 12.0 percen t for primar y school , from 8.0 to 7.8 percen t for second
a diplom a
school , and from 6.8 to a -1.7 percen t at the univer sity level (if
10, 11,
is receive d after four years of study) (King and others 1986; tables
husban d's
and 12). As in Griffi n's study, the family 's nonear ned income and
n (along
charac teristi cs are include d only in the paid-p articip ation equatio
with the woman' s marita l status and a variety of more contro versia l
identif ying variab les).
Khandk er (1989) subseq uently used the same Peruvi an Living Standa rd
He
Survey data to examin e the returns to school ing for both men and women.
ion
restric ts his analys is to wage earners and identi fies the sample -select
as well as
probit equatio n by the family 's land holdin gs and unearn ed income ,
relativ ely
the indivi dual's marita l status . The return estima tes appear to be
only in
robust to variati ons in this list of identif ying variab les include d
the sample -select ion equatio n.

For the countr y as a whole, women' s return s

The nonmar ket (reserv ation) wage of the wife is affecte d by the
W
her
family 's land, owners hip of a busine ss, assets , nonear ned income , and
wage
the
to
added
are
husban d's educat ion and experie nce. These variab les
is less
which
te,
status probit equatio n. The Heckman (1979) two-sta ge estima
in
(Griff
.16
efficie nt, yields an estima te of private return s to school ing of
1987, table 3).
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increase when controls are introduce d for sample selection , and returns are
then marginal ly higher for women than for men at the secondary and higher
schooling levels. At the primary school level in the metropol itan area of
. Lima, however, the returns are low for both sexes, but they are, lower for
The same pattern of
women than for men (2 percent compared to 2.5 percent).
low returns to primary schooling for women has been noted elsewhere in
metropol itan Latin America (see Schultz 1968) and has led some researche rs to
attribute this pattern to domestic servants which they then exclude from
samples in estimatin g wage functions (Mohan 1986).
The 1976, 1981, and 1986 Socioecon omic Surveys of Thailand permit
further evaluatio n of the effect of sample-s election bias on estimates of the
private rates of return to schooling for both women and men. In this case,
the analysis incorpora tes two selection correctio n terms represent ing the
probabil ity of being in the labor force and being a wage earner. These
selection equations include family nonearned income, hectares of family land
that are irrigated or unirrigat ed, and the standard market wage rate
determin ants, including years of schooling completed at the primary,
secondary , and higher education levels. Land ownership and nonearned income
raise the nonmarke t reservati on wage and thereby reduce the likelihoo d that a
person will take a wage job or work at all in the market labor force.
Education does not exert a monotonic effect on the labor force and
wage earner status of Thai men or women (Schultz 1989). An individua l with
primary schooling is less likely to be a landless wage laborer in this
primarily agricultu ral country. The more years of secondary schooling an
individua l has, the higher are the chances that she or he is working for a
wage. Each year of universit y education strongly increases the likelihoo d of
working in a.wage or salary job. Herein is a clue why the sample-s election
bias can operate in differen t direction s at different levels of schooling .
Many landowne rs are also wage earners. If they have enough land, however,
they presumab ly withdraw from the wage market to cultivate their own land full
The critical question is whether land is exogenous or merely a proxy
for self-empl oyment; in other words, is land a legitimat e variable to use to
time.

identify the selection model?
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An additional problem in specifying a wage function to estimate
returns to education in low-income countries is how to model the regional
segmentatio n of labor markets. Without interregion al migration, wage
functions should be estimated separately for each region. The wage
differences related to education within a region would then be the appropriate
parameter determining priorities for private investment in schooling in that
Interregion al migration does occur, however, and more educated
persons tend to migrate more frequently than others. Generally, they move
from lower to higher wage markets and from rural to urban areas. In Colombia,
closed region.

for example, as much as half of the lifetime returns to schooling for the
children of rural residents is realized by the increased likelihood that the
children will migrate from the rural to the urban labor market (Schultz 1988).
Analysis of this would require knowing where people migrated from, the costs
they incurred in moving, and where they received their schooling.
Alternative ly, holding an individual' s current residential regional labor
market statistical ly constant purges from the wage function an estimate of the
return to schooling that arises from higher wage regions which is more
frequent among the better educated (as it clearly is in Latin Americ~ and the
Models with and without regional shifters
provide a useful range of estimated returns to schooling. The greater the
interregion al mobility (as, for example, in Taiwan compared to China), the
stronger the case for treating the entire country as a single labor market

United States) (Schwartz 1976).

when estimating school returns.
Regional labor market nominal wage differences also may reflect
compensatin g variation for price levels and reinforcing variation in the
quality of subsidized public services. Nominal wage differences may not,
therefore, m~asure accurately real wage differences . Urban high-wage regions
have more and better schooling, and regional shift variables in a wage
function may also reflect this difference in the quality of schooling embodied
in workers across regions (Behrman and Birdsall 1983). Other than school and
health services, other prices particularl y for housing, are generally higher
in urban high-wage regions.

On balance, regional nominal-wag e differences

probably exceed real-wage differences , if public services are a relatively
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small part of family consumpt ion. Estimatin g the participa tion and wage
functions with and without regions as explanato ry variables should at least
help to assess the importanc e of migration in the estimatio n of school
The lack of informati on on migration in the Thailand survey data
does not permit any further analysis of this issue here.

returns.

The selection -correcte d private rate of return estimates are
contraste d in table 3.7 with those based on the ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates for wage earners that ignore the potentia l sample bias arising from
Two selection probit equations predict the
probabil ity that the individua l is in the labor force and is a wage earner
(Catsiapi s and Robinson 1982). Both the wage function and the two selection
selecting only wage earners.

equations vary across regions in Thailand: the least developed Northeas t
region, the rural populatio n, the suburban sanitary districts , the urban
municipa l areas, and finally Bangkok. Because regional shifters are specified
in the wage function, the private returns to education exclude the gains that
accrue to education through the more frequent migration of more educated
persons to regions with higher wages.
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Table 3.7: Estimates of Private Rates of Return to Schooling in Thailand,
by Gender, With and Without Statistic al Correctio n for
Sample-S election Bias

With Selection Correction~/

Without Correction£/
Year--Unit of Earnings
tS!!!!!J:!le of Earners£PoE ulation2

I.

II.

IV.

Secondan

Higher

1986--Monthl y Earnings
Female
(2,709/8,606 )

8.2
(4.75)

31.0
(18. 7)

9.5
(4.31)

Male
(4,199/7,685 )

14.0
(9.40)

18.0
(14.4)

12.0
(6.81)

1981--Monthl y Earnings
Female
(2,419/8,816 )

4.6
(2.41)

30.0
(19.7)

2.2
(. 74)

20.0
(17.4)

Male
(4,525/7,986 )
III.

Priman

15.0
(10.2)

Prima:£:!

SecondaJ;:I

Risher

25.0
(9.84)

18.0
(5.45)

6.8
(5.34)

7.8
(4.61)

9.0
(4.56)

22.0
(6.09)

12.0
(3.32)

4.2
(l.72)

15.0
(9.22)

8.8
(6.24)

2.9
(1.22)

13.0
(7.00)
17.0
(ll.3)

1981--Hourly Earnings
Female
(2,419/8,816 )

5.2
(2.70)

34.0
(22.l)

1.6
( .55)

10.0
(5.00)

25.0
(6.77)

11.0
(3.04)

Male
(4,525/7,986 )

16.0
(9.98)

24.0
(20.9)

5.4
(2.16)

14.0
(8.95)

13.0
(9.04)

4.1
( l. 66)

1976--Monthl y Earnings
Female
(l,464/9,430 )

ll.0
(8.87)

17.0
(13.8)

7.8
(3.63)

ll. 0
(8.70)

31.0
(7.04)

17.0
(6.35)

Male
(3, 783,!'.8,8362

5.7
t6.372

15.0
(16.52

8.4
t5.502

5.6
(5.332

7.4
(7. 65 2

ll.0
(6.852

li2.!..!!.:

Double selection correction terms are included in the earnings functions to capture the probability
of participatio n in the labor market and of selecting wage employment See text for identifying
restrictions .

~/ The estimation sample is restricted to wage and salary earners between the ages of 25 and 54.
on years of
£/~The absolute value of the t ratio is reported in parentheses beneath regression coefficient
education within each level of schooling.

£/ The absolute value of the t ratio is reported in parentheses, but it has not been adjusted for the
selection correction procedure, and is therefore biased.

Source:

Heckman 1979.

For most of this century, Thailand has invested heavily in primary
education . Still, it enrolls a smaller proportio n of its populatio n in
secondary school than do other countries at a similar stage in their
developm ent, such as South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippin es, and Malaysia, or
the two city' states of Hong Kong and Singapore (Sussangk arn 1988). On the
other hand, the proportio n of the Thai populatio n enrolled in higher education
is relativel y large for a country at its income level. The relative supply of
workers by education al level would lead to the expectati on that in Thailand
the returns to education would be relativel y high at the secondary level and
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relativel y low at the universit y levels, compared to other countries at
Thailand 's stage of developm ent.
Primary schooling has been nearly universal in Thailand for some
time, and hence the differenc e by gender is small. The differenc es between
male and female enrollmen ts at the secondary school level are more
substant ial, but are narrower in the 1975-85 period. Only about half as many
women as men were enrolled in Thai institutio ns of higher education in the
1970s (UNESCO 1984).
As reported in table 3.7 for 1981, for example, without sample
selection correctio n, women's hourly rates. of return appear to be 5 percent a
year for primary education , 34 percent for secondary school, and 2 percent for
For men, the OLS primary school returns are 16 percent;
secondary school, 24 percent; and universit y education , 5 percent. The
statistic al correctio n for the two sample-s election processes that might bias
these estimates modifies the estimates markedly in four out of the six cases.

universit y education .

Three out of four selection terms are statistic ally highly significa nt
(Schultz 1989). The return to primary education for women doubles to 10
percent, whereas the· returns to secondary school decline for both women (to 25
percent) and men (to 13 percent). Higher education private .returns increase
to 11 percent for women and decline to 4 percent for men.
The analysis is repeated with 1981 monthly earnings, thereby
including labor supply adjustmen ts related to schooling as part of the private
market returns. In four out of six compariso ns, the selection -correcte d
monthly returns are slightly lower than the hourly returns. The better
educated work fewer hours a month, or enjoy more leisure, respondin g to
education as-a gain in their wealth. Exception s are women at the higher
education level and men with only some primary schooling , who increase their
labor supply as their education increases . Overall, however, the hourly and
monthly earnings data yield similar results for the direction and magnitude of
the effect on schooling returns of the correctio n for sample selection . Only
the monthly earnings functions can be estimated from the earlier and later
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Thai surveys because respondents were not asked about hours worked during the
previous month.
By 1986, male and female returns to primary schooling had increased
from 1981, and the correction for sample selection continues to raise these
returns for women. At the secondary school level, women's high private
returns to schooling are diminished somewhat by the correction procedure, but
they are more than three times higher than male returns at this school level.
Finally, at the higher education level, private returns are higher for both
Thai women and men, though the sample-sele ction correction has again a greater
Only at the primary school level are the
returns to male education greater than those to female education. Going back
to 1976, the pattern of schooling returns is roughly comparable. Higher

effect of doubling female returns.

education earned slightly higher returns for men in 1976, 11 percent, compared
with 3 percent in 1981 and 8 percent in 1986; the rapid expansion of public
"open" universitie s in this period may have reduced the overall quality of a
year of higher education.
Much more work is needed to assess the effect of alternative methods
for coping with sample-sele ction bias as it affects estimates of returns to
education of women compared to men. Nevertheles s, these data from Thailand
spanning eleven years suggest that estimated levels of returns to schooling
may be sensitive to this source of sampling bias. The overall tendency is for
the sample-sele ction correction to raise returns to female schooling and lower
them to male schooling. With the exception of primary school returns after
1981, women's schooling appears to earn a more favorable return than does
men's schooling in Thailand.
An understandi ng of what underlies an individual' s allocation of
time is required to correct analyses of wage earners that seek to infer the
effect of investments in schooling on the productivit y of all people. This
sample-sele ction correction procedure depends on what the relevant family unit
is that may pool resources and coordinate labor market behavior, and how these
forms of family behavior are modeled.

The bargaining model implies a few,

possibly useful, differences between the empirical specificati on of the family
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model. On
labor supply model and that implied by the unified family demand
ficatio n
the whole, howeve r, both models require simila r variab les for identi
sions
of the sample -select ion rule determ ining wage earner status . Conclu
the family
drawn from this sectio n are likely to be robust to change s in how
decisio nmakin g proces s is eventu ally modele d.
NONMARKET RETURNS TO SCHOOLING

The effect s of school ing on market earning s are relativ ely well
problem s of
docume nted, althoug h sometim es subjec t to uncert ainty becaus e of
ing in
measur ement and estima tion. The eviden ce on the return s to school
r, and is
nonmar ket produc tion within the househ old is more fragme ntary, howeve
e such as an
inhere ntly diffic ult to aggreg ate or summar ize in a single measur
intern al rate of return .
The greate r the level of educat ion of marrie d women, the more likely
their
they are to work in the labor market and in wage employ ment, given
observ ed
husban ds' educat ion and busine ss capita l. This patter n has been
areas and
freque ntly in survey s in low-inc ome countr ies, partic ularly in urban
ed women are
in rural areas where off-far m employ ment opport unities for educat
ed women
reason ably develo ped. Thus, to work in the labor market , more educat
must curtai l their nonmar ket produc tion activi ties or at least find
· substi tutes for their time in nonmar ket produc tion.
in
At the same time, many studie s reveal that quanti fiable increas es
that they
home output occur as women' s educat ion increa ses, despite the fact
of women
are likely to spend less time in the home. That is, the produc tivity
in home produc tion appear s to increas e as their educat ion increa ses,
indica ting that nonmar ket return s to school ing are positiv e.

38

Determinants of Child Health and Survival

Studies in demogra phy, economi cs, anthropo logy, and sociolog y
conclud e that a strong inverse relation ship exists between a mother' s
schoolin g and the incidenc e of mortali ty among her children . This
relation ship is particu larly strong in low-inco me countri es. Many hypothe ses
have been advance d as to why (see, for example , Farah and Preston 1982;
Schultz 1984; Barrera 1988). The pattern has been widely replica ted across
compara tive surveys , such as the World Fertilit y Surveys , and over time based
on repeate d

censuse s.

Data that are now widely collecte d.from women in low-inco me
countri es on their age, childre n ever born, and children still living
facilita te analyse s of the determi nants of child mortali ty. Additio nal
informa tion on the timing of each birth and surviva l or date of death of the
offsprin g, improve s the measure ment of the mortali ty risk faced by each of a
woman's children . These refinem ents are particu larly useful in compari ng the
child mortali ty experien ce of younger women. Educati onal differe ntials in
child mortali ty are not very sensitiv e to which of these procedu res is used to
compare with simple child surviva l (Preston and Trussel l 1982). The
statist ical strength of the relation ship and its replica bility across surveys
and societie s is reminis cent of the "discove ry" in the 1960s of the
logarith mic wage function , which also depende d central ly on educatio n-based
differen ces in wage rates. One is a measure of the market rate of return, the
other a form of the nonmark et return to women's educatio n.
An added year of materna l educatio n tends to be associa ted with a
relativ ely constan t percenta ge change in child mortali ty rates. Althoug h
mortali ty t~nds to be higher in rural than in urban areas in many low-inco me
countri es, the proport ionate reductio n in child mortali ty associa ted with an
additio nal year of mother' s schoolin g is about the same, between 5 and 10
percent . The mortali ty-redu cing effect of father's educatio n is smaller ,
especia lly in rural populat ions (Mensch , Lentzne r, and Preston 1986).
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Studies in Latin America have noted that the differe ntials in child
mortali ty associa ted with materna l educatio n were more moderat e in Costa Rica
and Cuba. The hypothe sis for these deviatio ns is that these countri es' strong
public health program s have improve d access to health care, even among the
least-ed ucated mothers (Behm 1980). Other economi c hypothe ses for the
differen ces in the relative magnitu de of the effects of schoolin g on child
mortali ty are analyze d by Rosenzw eig and Schultz (1982) and are discuss ed
further elsewhe re (Schultz 1984; Thomas, Strauss , and Henriqu es 1987).
Is educatio n simply correla ted with the use of more health inputs,
or does educatio n provide a mother with the capacity to cope with health risks
and better manage her child's environm ent? An analysi s of the 1973 census in
.Colombi a indicate d that control ling for househo ld income, husband 's educatio n,
or the marital status of the mother did not elimina te or even greatly reduce
the indepen dent role of the mother' s educatio n as a partial explana tion for
her childre n's surviva l (Schultz 1980b). Studies elsewhe re have shown that
althoug h control ling for many lifetime events and changes in socioeco nomic
status in relation to child mortali ty rates is possibl e, the mother' s
educatio n still had a substan tial effect (Farah and Preston 1982). In Brazil,
a third of the mother' s educatio n effect on. child mortali ty could be explaine d
through control s for family income variabl es (Thomas and others 1987).
In addition to influenc ing child mortali ty, a mother' s educatio n
undoubt edly influenc es many interco rrelated variabl es such as migratio n, labor
market behavio r, use of health care, and modern attitude s. Control ling
statisti cally for these types of variabl es is, therefo re, likely to result in
an understa tement of the net effect of schoolin g (Mensch, Lentzne r, and
Preston 1986).
The puzzle that remains is why a mother' s educatio n explain s more of
the variatio n in child mortali ty than do other variable s such as an
individ ual's access to health care, the prices of health care, or even total
family income that could be spent on health care? Three competi ng hypothe ses
are that (1) the better educate d mother uses a differe nt mix of observa ble
health inputs; (2) she uses these inputs more effectiv ely, or (3) her
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inputs
educat ion is positiv ely correla ted with the use of many minor health
of these
that are not observ ed, and her educat ion is credite d with the effect
unobse rved inputs on child health (Schul tz 1984).
The most import ant health worker for childre n is their mother . How
her with
well she perform s this task depend s "on her school ing, which equips
new
genera l and specif ic knowle dge, and the means and confide nce to seek
inputs
ideas" (Barre ra 1988). How does educat ion influen ce the use of health
by
to reduce the probab ility of child mortal ity? The answer is sought
status
studyin g the variati ons in more continu ous indica tors of child health
and weight
that can be measur ed through survey s, includ ing the child's height
s and
at birth. Anthro pometr ic indica tors predic t lifetim e health problem
uent
mental and physic al develop ment handic aps accura tely, as well as subseq
women has
age-sp ecific mortal ity. Furthe r, the health care used by pregna nt
of
been analyz ed to evalua te the effect of this input on the "produ ction"
in
child health (Schul tz 1984). Selecti on of some health inputs occurs
e.
respon se to the mother 's expect ation of a good or poor birth outcom
lected
Conseq uently, the simple correl ation betwee n these forms of self-se
exampl e,
health care and health outcom es can be biased or mislea ding. For
such
prenat al care is sought from a doctor early in diffic ult pregna ncies;
a less
early prenat al care is thus not surpris ingly correla ted with having
early
health y and lower than averag e weight of the child at birth. But
a mother
prenat al care is noneth eless benefi cial fo·r an average women or for
consta nt.
and child whose initia l health condit ion can be statist ically held
on
In this United States study, the effect of the mother 's educat ion
ed
birthw eight is transm itted largely through the variati on in four measur
al care
prenat al health inputs : age, parity , smokin g, and timing of prenat
child helth
(Rosen zeig and Schult z 1989). The effect of matern al educat ion on
observ ed
in this cas~ is fully explain ed by educat ion's effect on the use of
health inputs .
The inputs that play a major role in produc ing good nutriti on, good
diffic ult
health , sound develop ment, and surviv al in an older child are more
mother
to measur e. A statis tical explan ation must also be found for which
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uses each of these health inputs, if their effect on the production of child
health is to be estimated without a self-selection bias.
Impact on child health of maternal education, health care
facilities, and interactions between mother's education and her constraints in
caring for her children's health may be simpler to examine directly.
Estimates of the health effects of these interactions document how maternal
education exerts its elusive effect on child health.

For example, Caldwell

(1979) hypothesized that in West Africa, a mother's education enabled her to
exploit local public health care more effectively. He suggested that the
interaction between mother's education and local public health infrastructure
was complementary or positive: more educated mothers gained most from local
According to his hypothesis, differentials in child
health or mortality, by mother's education, should increase in communities
served more intensively by a public health system. Rosenzweig and Schultz
(1982), however, found the opposite pattern of negative interactions or

public health clinics.

substitution in Colombia.

There differences in maternal education had a

smaller impact on child mortality in urban populations that received more
public and private hospital and clinic services per capita. Their findings
can be viewed as consistent with the aggregate patterns reported in Latin
America by Behin (1980) and Palloni (1981) and in Sri Lanka by Meegama (1981).
Other studies have examined the relationship between mother's
choices of health inputs and environmental constraints on child mortality. In
Malaysia, among those households with poor water and sanitation facilities,
breast-feeding was associated with reductions in child mortality (Butz,
Habicht, and DaVanzo 1984). Estrey and Habicht (1987) found that safe water
supplies reduced child mortality by a greater amount for more educated than
for less edueated mothers, whereas access to toilets in the household was less
effective in reducing child mortality in the case of educated mothers.
Costa Rica, Haines and Avery (1982) found that an additional year of a

In

mother's education reduced her children's mortality 6 to 7 percent, holding
constant household sanitation, quality of the dwelling, and community child
mortality levels and health care facilities.

Haines and Avery concluded that

the child health gains related to mother's education were smaller in urban
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areas, a result also found by Schultz (1980b) for Colombi a and by Behm (1976)
for several Latin America capital cities. Similar studies for Malaysi a and
Costa Rica treated the househo ld water and sanitati on infrastr ucture, as well
as the mother' s breast-f eeding, as exogeno us, in other words, as not affected
by materna l educatio n or unobser ved variabl es that might themsel ves have
otherwi se influenc ed child health outcome s.
Barrera 's study (1988) of househo ld and communi ty data from the
Bicol Provinc e of the Philipp ines refined these earlier studies . He assumed
that the water and sanitary faciliti es of househo lds were endogen ous choice
variabl es that may be correla ted with unexpla ined variatio ns in child health.
He first analyze d the relation between materna l educatio n and child health,
conditio nal on the commun ity's average levels of water and sanitati on but not
on the househo ld's actual variabl es, which are assumed to be spuriou sly
correla ted with the family's other choices . Barrera found that mother' s
schoolin g had a larger protect ive effect on child health in unsanit ary
commun ities where signs of excreta were visible and in commun ities that were
farther (in time) from outpati ent health care faciliti es. In a communi ty
where piped water was the predomi nant source of supply, the impact of mother' s
Where water-s ealed toilets were more prevale nt in the
comm.unity, the differen ces in the effect of materna l edµcatio n on child health
were larger. Because Barrera replaced househo ld-level measure s of water and
educatio n diminish ed.

toilet faciliti es by commun ity-level ones represe nting the local availab ility
of these faciliti es, he obtaine d conclus ions that were diametr ically-o pposed
to those of Estrey and Habicht (1987): the communi ty water supply appeared to
substitu te for mother' s educatio n, while modern toilets complem ented it
(Barrera 1988; table 16). At the same time, Barrera showed that higher income
and mother' s educatio n increase d the chances that a househo ld had acquired
piped water and water-s ealed toilets.
The duration of breast-f eeding, another importa nt input to child
health, is inverse ly related to mother' s educatio n in many countri es (see, for
example , Blau 1984; Wolfe and Behrman 1982). Table 3.8 illustra tes how in
A£rica, Latin America , and Asia, women with seven or more years of schoolin g
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tend to breast-feed their children seven or eight months less than do women
with no schooling.
Breast-feed ing is beneficial to child health primarily when it is
supplemente d by other foods before the end of the baby's first year. In
Barrera's rural Philippine population, mother's education shortened only the
duration of unsuppleme nted breast-feed ing (1988, table 23). Moreover, he
estimated that unsuppleme nted breast-feed ing was "beneficial " only up to six
months. The more educated mother can also replace her milk with more sanitary
substitutes . For the less educated, Barrera hypothesize d, supplement ation of
breast-feed ing at less than six months was harmful. Thus, the optimal
duration of breast-feed ing and the optional time to introduce supplementa ry
foods in the child's diet depended on the education of the mother who had to
provide sanitary substitutes for her own supply of milk. In sum, the duration
of unsuppleme nted breast-feed ing and education appeared to be substitutes in
This finding may partially account for why more
educated mothers breast-feed less, but their children's health is better
their effect on child health.
(Barrera 1988, table 25).
Determinants of Child Achievements in School

Surprisingl y few studies have addressed the household determinan ts
of school enrollment and attendance rates by gender in low-income countries.
In an analysis of district-le vel data from the Indian census of 1961,
Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) found that where child wages were higher,
children supplied more labor to the market and enrolled less in school. Male
wage rates were negatively associated with child schooling levels, while
female wages were positively associated with enrollment rates. Their model
implied these partial effects of wage rates on children's schooling, but only
after a number of cross-comm odity substitutio n patterns were imposed and price
(wage) effects were assumed to outweigh income effects. At the individual
level, data often show the father's education to be a stimulus to the child's
achievemen ts in school.

44
King and others (1986) estimate d from several Asian surveys the
determi nants of parents ' investm ents in schoolin g for their sons and
daughte rs. Analysi s of schoolin g decision s in greater detail, based on a

Peruvia n survey, permitt ed an analysi s of whether parents invest by sending
their childre n away to continu e their schoolin g, general ly at a private versus
local public school. A review of the schoolin g decisio n suggest s that both
access to a communi ty school and family income increase d enrollm ents,
particu larly for girls (King and Bellew 1988; Gertler and Glewwe 1988).
In most studies of the schoolin g of children in high-inc ome
countri es, the mother' s educatio n has a larger effect than the father's , even
though the father's educatio n implies a larger market income effect because he
tends to receive a higher wage and to work more hours (Leibow itz 1974; King
and others 1986). Evidenc e that the mother' s schoolin g exerts a greater
effect on the schoolin g of daughte rs than sons is less well establis hed (see,
for example , de Tray 1988: table 5). That hypothe sis require s further study.
Determinants of Fertility

More educate d women marry later, as shown in table 3.8 for the
countrie s include d in the World Fertilit y Surveys . In Africa, women with
seven or more years of schoolin g tend to marry five years later than do women
with no schoolin g; the differe ntial is about three years in Latin America and
Asia. Table 3.9 examine s how median age at first birth varies by a woman's
educatio n in eight African countri es, with further disaggr egation by age of
The effect of female educatio n on the age when a woman's
child-b earing begins is not uniform across Africa, but it is of growing
importan ce in such countri es as Kenya and Ghana, where overall fertilit y
the woman.

levels may s-oon begin to decline .
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Table 3.8: Women's Average Age at Marriage, Breast-feed ing,
and Contracepti on by Region and Education,
for World Fertility Survey Countries

Age at
MarriageM

Breast-feedi ng!?!

Contracepti ve
Usageg

Africa (8 to 12)
0 years
1-3
4-6
7 or more
Difference (7+-0)

17.8
19.2
20.3
23.0
5.2

19.9
18.5
15.7
13.4
-6.9

14
17
27
20

Latin America and Caribbean (13)
0 years
1-3
4-6
7 or more
Difference (7+-0)

19.5
19.5
20.4
22.6
3.1

15.0
12.1
9.1
5.4
-8.7

24
33
43
53
29

Asia and Oceania (7 to 13)
0 years
1-3
4-6
7 or more
Difference (7+-0)

20.2
19.5
20.6
23.8
3.6

20.1
18.4
16.0
10.6
-7.1

16
26
28
39
23

Region (Number of Countries),
Years of School Completed

7

Singulate mean age at marriage in years.
Mean duration of breast-feed ing in months using current status estimates
based on surviving births only using life table methods.
Percent of currently married women aged 15-49 currently using
contracepti on, adjusted for age differences between education groups.
Source:

United Nations (1987), tables 119, 121, and 122.
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Table 3.9: Median Age of Women at First Birth by Age
and Education, Selected African Countries
A e

Country, years of
schooling completed
Senegal
0 years
1 - 4
5 - 7
8 +
Difference (8-0)
Ghana
0 years
1 - 4

5 - 7
8 +

Difference (8-0)
Lesotho
0 years
1 - 4
5 - 7
8 +
Difference (8-0)
Benin
0 years
1 - 4

5 - 7
8 +
Difference (8-0)
Kenya
0 years
1 - 4

5 - 7

+
Difference (8-0)
Cameroon
0 years
1 - 4
8

5 - 7
8 +
Difference (8-0)
Ivory Coast
0 years
1 - 4

5 - 7
8 +

Difference (8-0)
Sudan
0 years
1 - 4

Younger Than
25

25 to 34

35 or Older

18.3
19.3
19.7
22.4
4.1

18.0
(18.6)
20.4
(23.0)
5.0

17.9
(19.6)
(21.0)
(23.0)
5.1

18.9
18.6
18.8
20.5
1.6

19.3
19.7
20.2
20.7
1.4

20.0
20.3
19.3
20.5
0.5

18.7
19.1
19.8
20.8
2.1

19.5
19.9
20.5
22.9
3.4

22.2
(19.8)
(21.1)
22.8
0.6

19.5
19.4
19.3
20.2
0.7

19.1
19.9
19.7
21.2
2.1

19.7
(19.8)
20.7
21.0
1. 3

18.2
18.6
19.1
21. 3
3.1

18.4
18.2
19.3
20.5
2.1

19.4
19.3
19.2
(21.5)
2.1

18.2
18.4
19.0
21.4
3.2

19.3
18.8
19.0
20.6
1.3

20.6
19.7
19.1
(24.3)
3.7

18.3
17 .6
18.2
20.2
1. 9

18.7
19.2
18.7
18.8
0.1

19.3
20.2
19.9
20.2
0.9

20.0
18.5
18.0
20.1
18.6
17.6
(21.0)
(19.6)
19.1
5 - 7
(23.6)
21.6
(20.3)
8 +
3.6
3.1
2.3
Difference (8-0)
Note: Means reported in parentheses are less reliable because they are based
on fewer that 50 observation s in the specific age-,educati on category.
Source:

World Fertility Surveys as tabulated by Eelens and Donne (1985),
tables A.9-A.16.
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The counter vailing .effects of decreas ed breast-f eeding on fertilit y
as mother' s educatio n increase s (table 3.8) may remove a month or so from the
interbi rth interva ls of the most educate d mothers (related to breast-f eeding
seven to eight months less). The much greater prevalen ce of contrac eption
among the more educate d women (table 3.8) more than fully compens ates in its
impact on fertilit y for this shorter duratio n of breast-f eeding.
As shown in table 3.10, total fertilit y rates are lower for women
with seven or more years of schoolin g compare d to those with no schoolin g.
The differen ces by women's educatio n are larger in Latin America (-3.6
childre n), than in Africa (-2.0 children ) or Asia (-3.1. childre n), but they
are relative ly uniform regardle ss of fertilit y measure .
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Table 3.10: Measur es of Recent , Cumula tive, and Desire d Fertil ity:
Averag es for World Fertil ity Survey Countr ies
Report ing, by Region and Respon dent's Educat ion
Region s (Number
of Countr ies)
Years of School ing
Comple ted by Women

Total
Fertil ity
RateY

Marita l
Fertil ity
Rate

Childre n
Ever Born!:?/

Desire d
Fami~
Sizec

Africa (8 to 10)
0 years
1-3
4-6
7 or more
Differe nce (0-7+)

7.0
7.2
6.2
5.0
-2.0

6.6
6.6
6.3
5.4
-1. 2

6.4
6.5
6.1
4.8
-1. 6

6.9
6.4
5.9
5.0
-1. 9

Latin Americ a (13)
0 years
1-3
4-6
7 or more
Differe nce (0-7+)

6.8
6.2
4.8
3.2
-3.6

6.8
6.2
5.2
3.8
-3.0

7.1
6.8
6.0
4.2
-2.9

4.8
4.7
4.2
3.7
-1.1

Asia and Oceani a (9 to 13)
0 years
1-3
4-6
7 or more
Differe nce (0-7+)

7.0
6.4
5.8
3.9
-3.l

6.6
6.4
6.1
4.7
-1. 9

6.7
6.7
6.4
4.9
-1. 8

5.4
4.3
4.2
4.0
-1.4

Age standa rdized .
Age 40-49 years.
Age adjuste d.
Source :

United Nation s (1987), table 112 and 115.

If one holds consta nt for marita l status , or essent ially age at
a third
first marria ge, (marit al) fertili ty differe nces by educat ion are about
are only
less than differe nces in total fertili ty in Africa and Asia, but they
nce is
20 percen t less in Latin Americ a, where overal l contra ceptiv e prevale
ever born,
high but varies greatl y by woman' s educat ion. To compar e childre n
ted their
the figures are restric ted to the age group of women who have comple
re, on
childb earing (ages 40-49) . These data are not inform ative, therefo
reprod uctive pattern s among younge r women or recent trends .
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The last aspect of fertility measured through the World Fertility
Surveys is women's desired family size. Desired fertility also falls
monotonica lly with a woman's education. Subtracting the desired fertility
from the current total fertility suggests that the potential for increased
contracepti on to reduce fertility toward desired levels is concentrate d among
women in Latin America with less than four years of schooling and in Asia
among women with less than seven years of schooling. Among the better
educated women, total fertility rates are already approaching desired
This reflects of the fact that women's education
substitutes for family planning by helping women reach their desired

fertility levels.

reproductiv e goals (Schultz 1989).
Other studies also indicate that women's education helps couples to
avoid exceeding their reproductiv e goals. This is partially achieved by
delaying marriage (Cochrane 1979), but more educated wives als.o have fewer
unwanted conceptions and births in marriage (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1985 and
1987). Although the husband's education may also enhance the effectivene ss of
contracepti on, the wife's education has at least as strong an effect on these
forms of reproductiv e behavior, whether inferred from a respondent 's own
classificat ion of conceptions as unplanned or derived from econometric
analyses of the reproductio n function and its residual (Rosenzweig and Schultz
1985, 1987, and 1989). Reduced fertility may be another sphere of nonmarket
production in which the education of women generates an important beneficial
social externality .
Although fertility during a woman's lifetime appears to decrease as
her education increases, in some cases the fertility of unschooled women is
slightly lower than that of women with one to three years of schooling (see
African region total fertility rates in table 3.10). This occasional reversal
in fertility differentia ls by women's schooling has two interpretat ions.
Easterlin (1975) proposed a framework for describing the demographic
transition that accommodate s the tendency for birth rates to increase at the
outset of modern economic growth before birth rates begin their secular
decline. This early rise in fertility has been attributed to improved
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materna l health and decreas ed breast-f eeding, both thought to increase
reprodu ctive potenti al before contrac eption was availab le and widely used.
The rise in fertilit y among women with a few years of schoolin g could,
therefo re, be attribut ed to the enhance d reprodu ctive potenti al of women who
receive only a couple years of schoolin g (Cochran e 1979 and 1988).
The second explana tion for this occasio nal reversa l in the fertilit y
differe ntial associa ted with a few years of women's schoolin g relies on the
househo ld economi c model of fertilit y. Economi c models of family
decision making focus attentio n on the potenti ally differe nt signs of the
effects of men's and women's schoolin g (or value of time) on their demands for
childre n and hence lifetime complet ed fertilit y (Schultz 1981). These
differen ces in wage effects on fertilit y, by source, follow from the customa ry
tendency for women to spend more time in child care activiti es than do men.
This economi c househo ld demand model of fertilit y helps to account for the
observe d tendency in multiva riate analyse s for female educatio n (or wages) to
be inverse ly related to fertilit y, while male educatio n (or wages), land or
asset income, and child wages are all directly related to fertilit y, at least
in a traditio nal agrarian society (Schultz 1973). At a later stage in the
developm ent process , the fertilit y effect of male educatio n (wages) may also
become negativ e because the parents invest more heavily in the schoolin g of
their childre n.
Thus, the simple one-way correla tion between women's educatio n and
their fertilit y can be a mislead ing indicato r of educati on's effect. To
estimat e the relevan t partial effect, one must hold constan t statisti cally the
other major exogeno us determi nants of fertilit y. The bias caused by omitting
these other determi nants, in the case of men's educatio n (or wages), is
undoub tedly.to reduce the estimate d negativ e effect of women's early
schoolin g, because the years of schoolin g of husband and of wife are strongly
positiv ely correla ted in all societie s, and men's educatio n (or wages) is
often positiv ely related to fertilit y, at least at low levels of educatio n.
All these routes by which women's educatio n may improve society -
reduced child mortali ty, enhance d child nutritio n, increase d child schoolin g,
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and reduced fertility--i nvolve benefits that are partly captured by the
women's own children. If parents are entirely altruistic toward their
offspring in a dynastic form of intergenera tional family and they thus view
their children's utility as identical to their own, these nonmarket activities
of women would be adequately encouraged within the family.
Parents may not view sons and daughters as equally important
branches of the family, however, or their perceptions of the payoff to
education may be based only on education's effects on wages in the labor
Many societies have strengthene d the rights of children and weakened
the economic claims parents can place on their children--f or example, through
restriction s on the conditions of child labor, mandatory school attendance,
and penalties for truancy. Also, many societies link improvemen ts in women's

force.

education to increases in the level of investment in the human capital of
children (Thomas 1989). A subsidy that favors women's schooling would help
shift private household resources toward investments in the quality of the
Empirical studies have not yet widely appraised how
responsive families would be to practical interventio ns that seek to educate
women in order to increase their investment in the.human capital of their

younger generation.

children, but some developmen t projects are testing these linkages (Martin,
Flanagan, and Klenicki 1986).
SOCIAL RETURNS TO SCHOOLING AND EXTERNALITIES OF EDUCATION

The social costs of schooling are traditional ly calculated by adding
public expenditure s on.educatio n to the private opportunity costs of the time
of students. Hence, the social returns to education are lower than the
private returns,- often by 20 to 30 percent. This adjustment should not cause
the returns to educating women and men to differ, unless the public resources
devoted to teaching women and men differ. In many parts of the world, higher
education for women is focused on specific professions , such as teaching and
nursing, which may be less costly to provide than other curricula. For
example, women in some countries receive much of their higher education in
"normal schools," which cost less per student per year than regular academic
institution s (see, for example, Birdsall and Fox 1985). This pattern is also
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Given higher costs for educating men, the social
returns from their schooling should be commensu rately lower. Much better data
are needed on these differen tial costs, however.

noted in India (Tilak 1987).

If a governme nt taxes labor earnings, it reduces private returns to
human capital and recovers some of its expenditu res on education , health, and
other public services. In most low-incom e countries , however, only wage and
salary workers are effective ly taxed, and no country has designed a tax on
The tendency for more men than women to work for a
wage and be taxed might appear to favor social investmen ts in the schooling of
males over females. This suppositi on, however, depends on how the labor
nonmarke t producti on.~

supply of men and women responds to the market wage offered to them (after
taxes). Most empirica l studies of labor supply in high- and low-incom e
countries indicate that women respond positivel y to an increase in their own
market wages and negativel y to an increase in their husbands' wages.
Conseque ntly, the taxable supply of women's labor rises with an investmen t in
women's capabilit ies and decreases with a comparab le investmen t in men's
capabili ties.

Moreover, estimates of the male labor supply often reveal a

Taxes on personal income are a relativel y small portion of
governme nt revenues in low-incom e countries . The exception may be Latin
American if one includes "social security" taxes (World Bank 1988a, p. 84) In
the case of Thailand in 1981, direct taxes on personal incomes amounted to
less than 5 percent of household expenditu res, and only 10 percent of
expenditu re for wage recipient s in Bangkok (National Statistic al Office,
undated). Most of governme nt revenues in low-incom e countries are from trade
and excise taxes on companies and commodit ies. Thus, adjusting for taxes may
be of secondary importanc e in many low-incom e countries , but it could be quite
importan t in industria lly advanced countries and moderate ly importan t in Latin
America.
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tendency for men to reduce their labor supply as their own wages rise.~
Thus, to the extent that governments recoup public expenditure s on investments
in human capital by taxing wages, the social return from investing in women
should be greater than that from investing in men.W
A more widely accepted rationale for public expenditure s on
education for both men and women is that an educated population enjoys a
higher level of welfare. Moreover, this gain is not entirely captured by more
educated individuals or their families. That human capital may be a source of
increasing returns helps to explain the puzzle of modern economic growth (T.W.
Schultz 1988; Kuznets 1966).
Supporters of public education may also argue that a more educated
society is more capable of managing a political system that protects
individuals ' rights and facilitates efficient and equitable growth. Although
these claims are difficult to substantiat e, more concrete examples have been
empirically confirmed. As noted earlier, most favor the schooling of females.

The marginal tax revenue, dR, generated by the expansion of
education for women, ~. and men, Em, can be expressed as follows:

~

Where a 1m and a 1w are the private rates of return to schooling of men and
women, which are assumed equal; E1w > 0 is the wife's uncompensa ted own wage
effect; ~ < 0 is the wife's uncompensa ted husband's-w age effect;, E1m ~ 0 is
0 is the husband's
the husband's uncompensa ted own-wage effect; and
signs are those
indicated
above
The
effect.
wife's-wage
ted
uncompensa
models (Cogan
supply
labor
family
d
instrumente
static
in
commonly obtained
1980; Schultz 1981).

~m=

A parallel public finance argument can be made for taxing more
W
heavily inelastical ly supplied factors, if the goal is not to distort the
optimal (that is, untaxed) allocation of factors. This tax criterion implies
that, given the labor supply parameters outlined in footnote 10, male labor
outcomes should be taxed more heavily than female labor outcomes because they
are inelastical ly supplied.
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CONCLUSIONS AND DIREC TIONS FOR RESEA RCH AND POLICY

of
Invest ments that increa se the prima ry and second ary schoo ling
on the curren tly
women are econo micall y warra nted on severa l ground s, based
te direc t and
availa ble eviden ce from many count ries. The public and priva
by the increa sed
oppor tunity costs of schoo ling appea r to be recove red fully
bette r educa ted
marke t produ ctivit y or poten tial wage gains experi enced by
return are
women during their adult lifetim es·. When intern al rates of
poten tial wage
calcu lated based on privat e costs of attend ing schoo l and
they are for men,
gains, the return s tend to be at least as high for women as
count ries,
varyin g from 30 to 10 percen t in the less and more develo ped
respe ctivel y (Psach aropou los 1973 and 1985).
s on
Socia l rates of return calcu lated to recoup public expen diture
prima ry schoo l
educa tion are fracti onally lower than priva te return s at the
instan ces marke dly
level. The socia l return s to highe r educa tion are in some
costs of unive rsity
lower than priva te return s, becau se of the relati vely high
value of
traini ng in low-in come count ries, includ ing the oppor tunity
for these
stude nts' time. In some cases, the public sector even pays
ng stipen ds
oppor tunity costs by provid ing schola rships and cost-o f-livi
1986a ).
regard less of the financ ial need of the studen t (World Bank
regate d
Althou gh public expen diture s on educa tion are rarely disagg
for female s than
by sex, the public costs of educa tion are likely to be lower
r for female s than
males. If so, the socia l return s are corres pondi ngly highe
are equal.
males, at least at the unive rsity level, when other things
rket
Eviden ce is accum ulatin g that schoo ling increa ses the nonma
can improv e her
produ ctivity . of women. For examp le, a mothe r's educa tion
status , and the
childr en's health , measu red by their birthw eight, nutrit ional
r descri bes how
absenc e of morbi dity and morta lity. Resea rch survey ed earlie
Studie s that
mater nal educa tion produc es these child health benef its.
m and policy
estima te the intera ctions betwe en mater nal educa tion and progra
and family
interv ention s confir m that in some circum stance s public health
for mater nal
planni ng progra ms provid e servic es that appea r to subst itute
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education (Schultz 1984).

The largest payoff in terms of nonmarket returns to

maternal education are realized where public health and family planning
programs are least developed. Differentials in child mortality by mother's
education are smallest, therefore, in urban areas served by relatively well
funded public health programs, and they are largest in rural areas that
generally lie outside of the reach of hospitals and public health and family
planning clinics.
The education of a woman is also associated with the educational
achievement of her children, her fertility, and her regional and occupational
mobility, controlling for her other household resources and productive
opportunities. Though less widely studied than the linkage between female
education and child health, these parallel relationships also confirm the
importance of female education to nonmarket productivity. For the most part,
the woman and her family capture these returns, which thus compensate the
intergeneratio nal family for the costs of her education. The nonmarket
returns to women's education may also represent a social externality, however,
and therefore warrant special public subsidy insofar as society at large
benefits from reduced fertility, diminished population growth, improved health
and education of children, and increased population mobility.
Investments in the schooling of women encourage a shift in the
allocation of women's time toward market work and away from home-based work.
Market-based work is counted in conventional national income accounts--and
hence adds to GNP--whereas home-based work is not. But this is no reason in
itself to encourage female education.

This shift in the allocation of women's

time may have other desirable consequences for the productive use of social
resources. For example, because better educated women are more likely to work
in wage employment than are less educated women, they tend to pay more direct
and indirect taxes. Increases in men's education that contributes to
increasing their wages, tend to reduce the number of hours their wives work in
the market labor force, and frequently, the men themselves work fewer hours as
Thus, social rates of return on women's education are, higher than
those on men's education, because the women's education returns more in taxes

well.

to support public schooling.
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Education and Fertility

Social scientists and statisticia ns studying child mortality and
fertility have used very different methods to estimate these relationshi ps.
Unless the common core of major exogenous economic vari_ables is held constant,
findings on the partial effects of women's education on child mortality and
fertility will be unstable and potentially misleading. Any focused literature
survey in these fields requires a clearly articulated research methodology .
Although parents universally prefer a reduction of child mortality,
there are times when couples do not want to limit their fertility. The effect
of a variable, such as mother's education, on fertility involves both its
effect on desired fertility (if birth control were costless and perfectly
reliable) and its effect on unwanted fertility (by reducing the cost of using
birth control with less uncertainty ). Therefore, surveys of the relationshi p
between education and fertility that do not control for the economic resources
available to a woman from her husband and from nonearned family income and for
the relative benefits and costs of children, do not always find a monotonic
inverse relationshi p between female education and fertility. Use of the
economic household demand model of fertility should make assessments of this
important aspect of fertility variation across low-income countries more
uniform.
Regional and Occupational Stratification

Returns to education are sometimes calculated within subpopulati ons.
If these subpopulati ons are defined by characteris tics that are fixed for
individuals ,.such as sex, race, or caste, interpretat ion of the returns within
each strata is straightforw ard.

If the subpopulati ons are not closed,

however, as in the case of regions or occupations , empirical estimates of
within-grou p returns to education are ambiguous and potentially misleading.
More educated individuals , male or female, are more likely than the
less educated to migrate from one region to another, holding constant
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e,
differ ential wage gains earned by migrat ion (Schwa rtz 1976). For exampl
wages
estima tion of the return s to school ing within a declini ng sector , where
rd bias to
are genera lly lower than elsewh ere, is likely to introdu ce a downwa
the return
estima tes of the return s to school ing. This occurs becaus e part of
sector .
to school ing in the declin ing sector involv es migrat ing out of that
s are
Conseq uently, rural-u rban stratif ied estima tes of educat ional return
or
potent ially mislea ding unless the strata can be defined by birthp lace
rates
reside ntial area where the individ ual attende d school . If migrat ion
ion
differ for men and women, this bias in estima ting the return s to educat
women
within a sector may distor t the estima ted returns to school ing for
relativ e to those for men.
For the same reason s, assess ing the returns to school ing among the
tend to be
self-em ployed is diffic ult. In the rural sector , the self-em ployed
The
landho lders or tenant s, and in the urban areas, small busines smen.
cycle in
probab ility of being self-em ployed increa ses genera lly over the life
ages, but
low-inc ome countr ies, and therefo re wage functio ns estima ted across
the human
within such an occupa tional group, are not readily interp reted in
market
capita l life-cy cle framew ork (Mince r 1974). The assessm ent of labor
to wage
return s to school ing may be more accura te if analys is is restric ted
analys is
earner s, whose wage rates approx imate hourly produc tivity. Such an
becaus e
must then be correc ted, howeve r, for the system atic bias introdu ced
d of the
only wage earner s remain in the sample . A joint analys is is require
inants of
indivi dual's occupa tional choice or alloca tion of time and the determ
of
market wage produc tivity. This is again the now-fa miliar problem
in this
correc ting for sample -select ion bias, which has emerge d repeat edly
ing of
paper as a major limita tion to existin g researc h on return s to school
women.
To evalua te the resourc e intens ity of the educat ional proces s, more
teache rs
detaile d inform ation is needed on the amount of time studen ts and
unity
expend on it. For studen ts, the resourc e input is the privat e opport
homewo rk.
cost of the studen t's time alloca ted to school attenda nce and school
the
For teache rs, it is the teache r's input or time, adjuste d perhap s for
of time
number of studen ts he or she teache s in a class and for the amount
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required for preparati on of class material. These school inputs may differ
for female and male students, though they are both enrolled in the same level
of a school system. More accurate measures of the private and social costs of
a year of school enrollmen t for males and females in distincti ve branches of
the education al system might help explain subsequen t differenc es in their
adult producti vity and might modify resulting estimates for the private and
social returns to schooling for women and men.
Increasing Female School Enrollment

Available evidence indicates that schooling for women is justified
in terms of efficienc y (high market social returns), equity (an increase in
the capabilit y of the poor relative to the rich), and intergene rational
redistrib ution (better health and education of children and slower populatio n
growth).
Why then does the shortfall in female education relative to male
education persist in South and West Asia and in North and Sub-Saha ran Africa?
Part of the answer undoubted ly lies in the family decisionm aking process that
attaches less value to the future productiv ity of daughters than to that of
Parental claims on the adult productiv ity of boys may be more secure in
some family-c ultural systems than their future claims on girls. The public
sector school incentive structure may also subtly encourage males more than

sons.

females to remain in the school system. If parents' allocatio n of school
investmen ts between boys and girls does not lead to a socially optimal
intergene rational pattern of investmen t in human capital in some countries ,
what should be the role of public policy? The inefficie nt allocatio n of
resources , even if we do not know the precise cause, can frequentl y be
corrected by a judicious applicati on of taxes and subsidies , but few studies
have isolated policy changes that have a clear impact on female enrollmen t
rates (Martin, Flanagan, Klenicki 1986).
Much economic research on the family assumes that it behaves as if
it had unified preferenc es and pooled its economic resources . This model
explains how the family should make productio n decisions but does not
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prescrib e the factors affectin g consump tion pattern s within the family, or who
receive s educatio n. Another approach to the unified family demand model is
one that explici tly recogni zes the distinc t interes ts of husband and wife and
explore s how bargain ing might influenc e the allocati on of time and resourc es
within the family. Researc h is only beginnin g to conside r across culture s how
game theory might illumin ate critica l family decision s that affect levels of
health, nutritio n, and educati onal resource s invested in girls and boys
(Schultz 1989).
General developm ent process es contrib ute to increase s in per capita
income and to reductio ns in the relative cost of teacher s. Both of these
factors contrib ute to increas ing school enrollm ent rates and reducing the
imbalanc e between female and male enrollm ent rates (Schultz 1987). Beyond
these general factors , how educatio nal service s are produce d and delivere d
also probabl y affects the male and female mix of enrollm ents. Evaluat ion is
needed to assess what reforms in the school system are cost-ef fective
approac hes to closing the gap between the socially desired gender mix of human
capital investm ents and the mix now being private ly demande d and publicly
provide d.
Because parents may be more willing to send a son than a daughte r to
a distant school, .making small-s cale, communi ty schools availab le may be more
importa nt for raising female enrollm ent rates than is improvin g quality of the
schools by consoli dation, if that involves longer travel times for student s.
Parents may prefer that their daughte rs be instruc ted by female teacher s and
may be more willing to send their daughte rs to school if the school preserv es
a degree of traditio nal sex segrega tion in faciliti es. Researc h, however , has
seldom sought to measure how variatio n in school faciliti es, staffing
pattern s, location , and sex segrega tion influenc e parents ' decision s to send
their daughte rs or sons to school, holding constan t at least the parents '
Such analysi s must be conduct ed at the househo ld level
on the basis of random househo ld surveys and must encompa ss a substan tial
number of commun ities pursuin g differe nt educati onal policie s.
income and educatio n.
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To educat e their childre n, parent s must be willing to forego the
s confirm
home labor of their childre n while they attend school . Many studie
1983). In
that teenage daught ers work more in the home than do sons (Evenso n
at home,
additio n, when family member s become ill and need specia l attenti on
this home
it is teenage daught ers that are held back from school to provid e
care (Pitt and Rosenz weig 1988). If means were found to reduce the
their
househ old's depend ence on the home labor of teenag e daught ers, would
ated
enrollm ent in school increas e? The decline in fertili ty that is facilit
for
by family plannin g program s may reduce demand s on daught ers to care
and market
younge r sibling s in the home. Improv ed home produc tion techno logy
home, and
service s could additio nally reduce the demand for child labor in the
of such
dispro portion ately benefi t daught ers who perform more than their share
stoves ;
tasks. Improv ed water suppli es; reduced fuel require ments of modern
food
increas ed specia lizatio n of firms and familie s, which would permit
old,
proces sing and storag e to become market -purcha sed inputs to the househ
ive
would all reduce the relianc e on home-p roduced , child labor- intens
activi ties.
The situati on of women varies widely within and across countr ies.
of
The challen ge is to set priori ties that have the highes t probab ility
e the
increas ing female enrollm ent rates in each specif ic society . Becaus
in such
direct and indire ct effect s of many of these program s are uncert ain
popula tions
varied circum stances , collec ting baselin e and longitu dinal data on
import ant.
served by pilot and test program s and new policie s is partic ularly
the
Such data would permit future evalua tion of program conseq uences on
of women and
educat ional attainm ent of women; on the produc tivity and behavi or
ies.
men; and on the welfar e of their familie s, commu nities, and countr
Response to Lags in the Perception of Parents

Parent s appear to be respon ding to the growin g eviden ce in the
better
develo ping world that more educat ed sons and daught ers get distin ctly
ces
jobs. Genera lly, they will earn more than enough to justify the sacrifi
parent s make to send them through school .

Microe conomi sts have amasse d enough
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supporting evidence on wage differentials to provide a human capital
explanation for the growth in school enrollments in most low-income countries.
Quantitative assessment of how better educated mothers create
healthier children who have a greater chance to survive to adulthood is more
difficult. Appraisal of the effect of maternal education on child nutrition,
cognitive development, and school achievement is still more subtle. The
majority of parents may not yet fully appreciate these complex and extended
lifetime relationships, indeed, social scientists do not yet fully understand
them either. Even if the current clues in the literature are confirmed by
new, more thorough analyses and surveys, parents may still require some time
to digest and act on this new body of evidence.
How will this information, as it diffuses through society, tend to
affect behavior? Young men, encouraged by their parents, should become more
willing to "pay" more, or sacrifice their interests to a greater degree, to
marry a more educated woman.
to work in the labor force.

This will occur even when a wife is not expected
As this increased demand for the nonmarket

productivity of educated wives becomes apparent, parents may also perceive the
monetary and psychological gains they will receive by investing more heavily
in the schooling of their daughters.
The historical record has not yet been adequately analyzed, but the
nonmarket productivity gains associated with women's education may be a
relatively recent phenomenon in some parts of the world. In the past, when
effective modern health inputs, such as antibiotics, vaccines, and oral
rehydration salts, were not readily available to low-income populations, the
ability of a·more-educate d mother to shelter her child from health risk may
have been much more limited than it is today. Modern inputs to home
production activities may be especially useful to better educated women. The
better educated woman today can control her reproduction with greater ease and
certainty than was possible in the past, because of the widening range of
birth control techniques. Nonetheless, until more women participate in the
paid labor force, parents may persist in their belief that the education of
their daughters is of secondary importance to that of their sons.
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The resulti ng alloca tion of resour ces is viewed today as unecon omic,
governm ents
but existin g policy researc h has not addres sed the questio n of how
be
might compen sate for this traditi onal bias. What policie s should
return s
encour aged on the basis of the accumu lating eviden ce that the market
nonmar ket
to school ing of women are at least as high as those of men, and that
social
produc tive return s to women' s educat ion are associa ted with major
ich
extern alities --in child health , nutriti on, school ing, and fertili ty--wh
variety
many societ ies want to subsid ize. Higher quality researc h in a wider
pment
of setting s could bolste r the case for policy interve ntions . Develo
now, to
agenci es should initiat e pilot program s and experim ental policy tests
before the
begin identif ying promis ing, cost-e ffectiv e policy option s. Even,
involve d in
pilot program s can be fully evalua ted, howeve r, governm ents can be
s
the evolut ion of researc h that docume nts the local returns to women'
produc tivity
educat ion, both in labor market wage differe nces and in nonmar ket
gains.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPfER III: MODELS OF THE EDUCATION
PRODUCTIVITY REIATIONS~

A positive relationship between the schooling of workers and their
earnings is observed in household surveys and censuses in many countries
(Psacharopoulo s 1985; Blaug 1976). This empirical regularity was first
examined in high-income countries, such as the United States, and then
described for many other countries. The conventional economic interpretation
is to assume wages measure labor's marginal product and that people acquire
education, as they do vocational training, at the cost of foregone labor
market opportunities, which will be repaid by future streams of enhanced
earnings. The emphasis given to monetary returns to education does not
preclude the private and social importance of nonmarket production returns to
schooling or, for that matter, the pure consumption benefits of schooling.
The early focus on labor market returns reflected the availability of data and
the historic reliance of economists on the marketplace to measure value by the
effect on the national income accounts.
The treatment of education as a form of capital investment embodied
in the human agent can be traced back at least as far as Adam Smith, though it
enters into the mainstream of economic thinking in the 1950s and 1960s in the
work of T.W. Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964). The empirical relationship of
wages and schooling is conceptualized as a life-cycle regularity or age-wage
profile, with the wage increasing first in the cross-section with the age of
the worker and then decreasing beyond some age, when depreciation of
productive skills outweighs new investments in human capital. Mincer (1962)
proposed human capital investments on the job after the completion of
schooling as. an explanation for the age-earnings profile. By assuming that
post-schooling human capital investment declined regularly with the worker's
accumulation of labor market experience and that human capital investment
eventually ceased as retirement approached, Mincer (1974) was able to account
for many interrelated aspects of earnings for males in the United States, by
schooling and by post-schooling experience.

This appendix is derived from Schultz 1988.
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These basic empirical regularitie s are summarized in the earnings
function. This relationshi p has many interpretat ions, however, depending on
what factors generate the relationshi p (Rosen 1977).

Assume that the real

wage, w, of a worker is a function of that individual' s years of schooling, s,
and other productive characteris tics, z, such as ability; that is,

(1)

w - f(s,z),

where z is assumed exogenously given to the individual, while hours of work,
school quality, and nonschool investments in productive marketable skills are
If the private cost of schooling to the student or family
is approximate d by the full-time opportunity cost of the student's time not
spent working in the labor market, then the present value, V of the

initially 'ignored.

individual' s future earnings can be evaluated at the age of entering school
as,
V(s, z) -

J:

w(s, z)•rt dt

(2)

where n is the number of years between the time the individual enters school
and then retires from the labor force and ceases to benefit from education.
If the internal rate of return to additional schooling falls with increased
schooling, and the discount rate or financial constraint, r, does not vary
across schooling levels, then the family or individual continues to invest in
schooling until the present value of the individual' s earnings is maximized.
The optimal level of schooling is that which equates the opportunity costs of
attending school (that is, not working) to the discounted value of the
lifetime gain obtained from the increment to schoQling, adjusted for the
finiteness of the working life; that is,
(3)
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where w5 is the partial derivative of the wage with respect to schooling. If
-m
retirement is viewed as infinitely distant, permitting one to neglect e , the
following expression for the logarithmic wage equation is obtained:
ln w - ln rV(s,z) + rs,

(4)

Interperson al differences ins shift the wealth intercept and slope of the
wage with respect to the discount rate, while differences in z affect the
intercept. Thus, observation s on ln wands do not generally identify the
wage function (1) or the optimal schooling attendance rule, s = D(r,z).
Observation s on ability, z, and the financial constraint, r, may permit one to
describe empirically the wage and schooling functions. If capital markets are
perfect, and r is the same for everyone, differences in z may allow one to
estimate r from a regression of the logarithm of the wage on years of
schooling. This estimate does not describe how schooling affects the earnings
of any particular person, because z may still influence how much schooling is
optimal for each individual.
This interpretat ion of the wage equation (1) is called a reduced
form hedonic wage equation. It embodies both a school attendance equation
conditiona l on rand z, and a wage function conditional on sand z (Rosen 1974
This hedonic wage function does not presume to identify how
individuals vary their school enrollment in response to human capital returns
or how the derived demand for labor depends on the educational attainment of
the worker. This hedonic interpretat ion of the wage function, however, admits

and 1977).

more readily to the existence of market imperfectio ns and unanticipat ed
developmen ts contributin g to substantial disequilibri um rents in the implicit
valuation of different types of inelastical ly supplied skills (Tinbergen 1956;
Rosen 1977; Lucas 1977; Heckman and Sedlachek 1985).
The more common interpretat ion of the wage function is that
developed by Mincer (1974) in which everyone is equally well off from a
lifetime perspective ; long-run equilibrium , achieved through compensatin g
differences in costs and gains, leaves individuals indifferent among
alternative levels of investment in schooling. In this case, ln rV(s,z) is
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identical for everyone, or at least it is unrelated to schooling. Regressions
of ln wons provide estimates of r that can be interpreted as the average
private internal rate of return on the opportunity costs of schooling for a
representat ive individual.
To accommodate a monotonica lly declining rate of on-the-job human
capital investment by workers after finishing school, Mincer (1962 and 1974)
illustrates how a quadratic in post-school ing labor market experience, x,
could describe proportiona te changes in wages, net of on-the-job training
costs:
(5)

where i now refers to .the variables that are observed to differ across
individuals , and ei is the residual error that is assumed to be uncorrelate d
with all right-hand- side variables. When xis unobserved, Mincer (1974)
approximate d it by age minus age of entry into the school system, minus years
of schooling completed. In other words, he assumed for males at least that
they are attached full-time to the market labor force after completing their
schooling. Hanushek and Quigley (1985) incorporate information on actual
employment experience for males, assuming that on-the-job training is
curtailed during spells of unemployme nt. For women, the above empirical
approximati on that all post-school ing experience is equally relevant to market
earnings may seem particularl y misleading. Mincer and Polachek (1974)
demonstrate the differentia l effects of spells of market and non-market work
experience on women's market earnings in the United States.
The post-school ing experience variable originally proposed by Mincer
has the attraction of not being subject to the control of the individual, once
schooling has been determined. Therefore, it is not a choice variable or one
that is likely to be systematica lly correlated with unobserved market-orie nted
abilities or preferences ; that is, it is not simultaneou sly determined.
Women's actual entry into and exit from the labor force and even unemployme nt
are endogenous choice variables, however, and must be jointly modeled with
training investment, if the effect of labor market experience of women is
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reduce d-form wage
clearl y an endoge nous variab le and canno t be includ ed in a
equati on.
ms.
This human capita l approa ch poses four broad overla pping proble
such as abilit y,
First, the omiss ion of variab les that may determ ine wages ,
on may lead to
from the above simpl ified speci ficati on of the earnin gs functi
and wages that
biased estim ates of the partia l assoc iation betwee n schoo ling
of return
is the basis for benef it-cos t calcu lation s or intern al rate
estim ation.
Second , the profil e of post-s chool ing, on-the -job traini ng
proxie s for
invest ment canno t gener ally be observ ed, althou gh altern ative
ed.
Mince r's post-s chool ing invest ment profil e have been propos
vation of
Third is the absenc e of suitab le compa rison groups . Obser
ed more or less
what partic ular person s would have earned if they had obtain
schoo ling than they actua lly did is not possib le.
and
Fourth is a disco ntinui ty betwe en the conce ptual framew ork
their produ ctive
observ ations . Theory pertai ns to indivi duals invest ing in
indivi duals of
capac ity over a life cycle, but most data relate to differ ent
etic" life-c ycle
differ ent ages, which are then combin ed to descri be a "synth
profil e of earnin gs by age.
of the
All of these proble ms in the human capita l interp retati on
as "revis ionist "
relati onshi p betwe en schoo ling and earnin gs could be viewed
ulate the human
in spirit . This is becau se they attemp t to revise and reform
use bette r
capita l conce pt, to modify its empir ical speci ficati on, to
t more appro priate
estim ating techni ques for the wage equati on, and to collec
. Other critiq ues
data to bring the eviden ce closer to the core of the theory
regul arity seek a
of the human capita l interp retati on of the educat ion-wa ge
nces labor marke t
fundam entally differ ent way to explai n how educa tion influe
outcom es.
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The primary alterna tive hypoth esis is that of signal ing or screen ing
not act to
(Spence 1973; Arrow 1973). Accord ing to this view, educat ion does
ually
train or to social ize a worker to perform more produc tive tasks individ
Rather , educat ion filters or screens the native ability or
ability is
produc tivity of the worker , withou t enhanc ing it. Inform ation on
es in
signale d to the employ er by the worker 's investm ent of time and resourc
or in a team.

ing may
the acquis ition of s~hool ing. A private rate of return from school
return
still be inferre d from the schooli ng-wag e relatio nship, but the social
is
to school ing become s a more comple x issue if the screen ing hypoth esis
assign more
accept ed in its entire ty. The produc tion of inform ation needed to
yields a
able worker s to jobs in which these abiliti es are more produc tive
nt
social produc t. What is not clear is whethe r educat ion is an efficie
ion would
mechan ism for matchi ng worker s and jobs. To many observ ers, educat
of
seem to be a time-co nsumin g and costly way to screen for the ability
tive
worker s, if schools do not also augmen t their skills . If an alterna
the
screen worked as well as educat ion but had lower social costs, then
altern ative scheme would be social ly prefera ble to educat ion.
The simple fact that no society , capita list or social ist, has
needed
pursue d an alterna tive scheme to educat ion to produc e the inform ation
e form of
to match worker s to jobs casts doubts on the validi ty of this extrem
esize
the signal ing hypoth esis. A more modera te interp retatio n would hypoth
in the
that school creden tials provid e an import ant source of inform ation
access at
labor market on worker produc tivity, one that employ ers can readily
Educat ional attainm ent is a means of discrim inating statist ically
as "fair"
among worker s in hiring ; it is also a means that is accept ed by some
sex, age,
(Blaug 1985); many other individ ual charac teristi cs such as race,
low cost.

marita l status , and ethnic group, which might be used to discrim inate
.
statis tically are increa singly challen ged by some as social ly unfair
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